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This research provides an analysis of Norway's security
policy from World War II to the present. The growth of
Soviet military power and the Norwegian response in the
evolution of its security policy are discussed in order to
discern the strength of NATO's northern flank. The
adequacy of Norway's policy of detente and reassurance has
been questioned with respect to the premise of warning time
and reinforcement. Norway's policy has been successful,
but with increasing national disunity regarding NATO's
nuclear policy, the questionable "guarantee of reinforce-
ment," and the need for political courage and decisiveness
in a crisis. Given Norwegian disunity, the Soviet Union
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I. I NTROD LiCT I Oil
Norway (see Figure 1) has been compared with West
Berlin in that it cannot be defended directly or readily
protected by U.S. military power. 1 The defense of
Norway in the face of the disparate military situation that
prevails in the North is also based on the willingness of
the NATO countries to resist Soviet pressure on Norway and
on the capability of NATO to reinforce Norway in time of
crisis. West Berlin is linked to West Germany and the rest
of the alliance by air, rail and land lines which are
subject to Soviet interdiction. With the expansion of
Soviet capabilities in the North and in particular the
expansion of the Soviet Northern Fleet, Norway's ties via
air and sea are also subject to Soviet interdiction.
The northern flank of NATO is of critical importance to
the alliance but on the surface it appears to have been
consigned a neglected role as a secondary front. This is
borne out by a survey of the Washington Post and New
York Times on articles concerning NATO's northern members
(Norway, Denmark and Iceland). During 1980/81 the New
York Times carried a total of eleven major articles (i.e.,
articles of more than 15 words) on Denmark and Norway but
none on Iceland and the Washington Post only printed
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Figure 1 . Map of Norway
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Iceland. 2 In examining Norway's role on the northern
flank it is apparent that Norway plays a critical role and,
as American defense expert Robert Weinland has said, "World
War III may not be won on the northern flank but it could
definitely be lost there."
Since "survival is a prerequisite to achieving any
goals that states may have," 3 Norway's choice of NATO
membership as the best means to ensure its continued
survival will be discussed in Chapter II. Since that
decision in April 1949 the global strategic situation has
changed. The basic changes and resultant effects on the
forces will be discussed in Chapter III.
Norway has been criticized for now being willing to
bear its fair share of the cost of the NATO alliance by its
steadfast refusal to allow either foreign troops and bases
or nuclear weapons on its territory during peacetime. This
seeming incongruity can be readily understood in light of
the two basic tenets of Norwegian security policy:
deterrence and reassurance. NATO membership is the prime
component of deterrence while the restrictions on Norway's
participation in NATO are the primary elements of Norway's
policy of reassurance. These will be discussed in
Chapter IV.
With the Soviet Union as its northern most neighbor,
Norway has a deep and abiding interest in detente and has
actively sought to maintain a harmonious relationship with
12

the Soviet Union. The post war years have been character-
ized by a series of crises. These and the unresolved
issues of Svalbard, the division of the continental shelf
in the Barents Sea and Norwegian-Soviet Gray Zone agreement
will be discussed in Chapter V.
Another aspect of Norwegian security (Chapter VI) is
the concept of a "Nordic Balance" 4 which has been
credited as one of the stabilizing factors in the North and
as a contributor to the low state of tension which has been
maintained there. In the last section, Chapter VII, the
conclusions of this thesis will be presented and discussed.
13

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I
^-Herschel Kanter, "The U.S. Navy: Fleet of the
Future or the Past?," Arms Control Today , July 1978,
p. 3 .
2Annelise Hopscn, "Could NATO Be Eetter
Understood?," NATO Review , Vol. 31, No. 2, July 1983,
p. 24. (This may be a comment on the U.S. public's level
of interest rather than on the degree of attention NATO
devotes to the northern flank.)
^Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International
Politics , Reading: Add is on-Wesley Publishing Company,
1979, p. 92.
^For purposes of this paper the Nordic area will be
the area encompassed by Norway, Denmark, Sweden and
Finland. Some authors, when referring to Scandinavia, will
include Iceland in this grouping.
14

II. NEUTRALITY TO ALLIANCE
A. BACKGROUND
Norway prior to World War II has not participated in a
war since 1814 , when Norway was ceded to Sweden by Denmark
in the Treaty of Kiel signed on 14 January 1814. This
Swedish-Norwegian Union was long troubled by Norwegian
agitation. This agitation, coupled with a conflict over
business interests, in particular the interests of an ocean
going merchant marine on Norway's part, led to a dissolving
of the Union in 190 5. Norway became an independent country
partly through a need for an independent foreign policy
based on economic concerns rather than through disagreement
with Sweden over a policy of neutrality. In fact,
Norway pursued a policy of neutrality from its independence
until its involvement in the Second World War.
B. NONALIGNMENT
Norway successfully maintained her position of
neutrality during World War I. This is not to say that
Norway's neutrality was "sacrosanct." Norway protested
both Allied and German actions, with the first of such
notes being delivered in November 1914. 6 Trade was
balanced between Germany and Britain, with the former
receiving fifteen per cent of Norway's fish catch and the
latter eighty-five per cent. 7 The Scandinavian policy
15

of neutrality was reaffirmed in meetings of foreign and
prime ministers in Copenhagen and Oslo in 1916 where a
joint policy concerning the handling of belligerent
violations of neutral rights was established. 8
The war years were in fact a period when large profits
were gained from neutrality. "The warring powers outbid
each other to secure goods and services, and the Germans
paid liberally for clandestine purchases of goods from
America and other overseas sources which had been allowed
through the Allied blockade for use inside
Scandinavia. "9
This is not to say that Norway did not pay a cost for
its "non-involvement." The Norwegians had been induced to
charter most of their 2 1/2 million tons of shipping to
Britain with the resultant loss of over 1 million tons and
2,000 lives to German action. 10 Aside from these
losses, though, Norway survived relatively intact.
The interwar years were a period of economic crisis
where Norway saw the League of Nations as an agency for the
maintenance of world peace based on democratic principles
and collective security. Norway maintained from the outset
that one of the primary functions of the League was to
organize world disarmament.
In keeping with this policy Norway cut back its defense
forces. Norway felt that League membership represented
only a qualified abandonment of their traditional
16

neutrality and that by taking a lead in disarmament both
their neutrality and survival in an uncertain world would
be enhanced. Efforts to arm were viewed as unnecessary and
provocative and behind the "somnolent military was a
somnolent Storting (Parliament) and a somnolent
people. "H- The interwar years produced no major
reevaluation of Norwegian security policy, and the eve of
the war found Norway with a small army, 57 obsolete naval
craft and a few antiquated fortifications.
In April 1938 the Scandinavian foreign ministers had
committed their countries "to stand outside all power
combinations, refuse to be drawn into war, and aid each
other economically."^ Norway's position was again
reaffirmed in the Spring of 1939 when Norway refused to
enter into a non-agression pact with Germany. When the war
in Europe erupted in September 1939, the Norwegians were
bent on preserving their neutrality" The
Scandinavians held several ministerial conferences and at a
meeting in Copenhagen the ministers formally declared their
neutrality, pledged their mutual assistance, and drafted a
joint declaration on Nordic nonintervention in the
war.^ In part these efforts were an attempt to
buttress Finland against Soviet pressure - an effort that
ultimately failed. Once Finland had been attacked by
Soviet forces, the British and French requested permission
to cross Norwegian and Swedish territory to render
17

assistance to the beleagured Finns. Permission was refused
by both Norway and Sweden as it would violate their
positions as neutrals.
^
Norway's neutrality was only respected by either side
as long as its own interests were served. Joseph Stalin is
credited with having stated that anything could be argued
except geography, ° and it was the geography of Norway
which proved her ultimate downfall. For Norway there was
the danger of German actions to ensure continued use of the
Norwegian Leads for the shipping of Swedish iron ore and to
obtain a better striking position for ships and aircraft
against the Allies in the North Atlantic. These fears were
counterbalanced by fears of "British and French action to
stop the o're to Germany ... and because Churchill was
likely to regard the German use of the passage through the
Norwegian Leads as calling for drastic naval action." 17
As for the Germans, Hitler wished to preserve the
neutrality of Scandinavia, which worked to his advantage.
The Germans were utilizing the Norwegian offshore islands
to provide protection for Swedish iron ore shipments and to
mask the movement of captured ships. "Hitler's belief that
the neutrality of Scandinavia worked to his advantage was
strictly conditional upon the continued acceptance of that
advantage by his opponents" 18 and in February 19 40 the
British gave clear indications that Norwegian neutrality
would no longer be respected. The British seized the
18

ALTMARK on 16 February 1940 in Jossingfjord as it covertly
transited Norv/egian waters with a cargo of 29 9 prisoners of
war (British seamen seized by the GRAF SPREE)
,
19
The British and French decided that the ore traffic and
other German violations of Norwegian neutrality could no
longer be tolerated. With this in mind they reached a
decision that they themselves would have to violate
Norway's neutrality by mining the Norwegian Leads. 20
On 5 April 1940 "notes were handed by the British
ambassadors at Oslo and Stockholm to the Norwegian and
Swedish governments informing them of the British
intention." 21 Both countries protested; to the
Norwegians, the danger appeared to be not from the mines
themselves, but rather in the German reaction to
them. 22
Prior to these actions Hitler had had an invasion plan
of Norway drawn up. The stated goal of this plan was that
"This operation should prevent British encroachment in
Scandinavia and the Baltic; further it should guarantee our
[German] ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force
a wider start line against Britain." 2 -^
British minelaying took place on the morning of
8 April 1940, while Hitler's troops were already embarked
for the "Weserubung" (German code name for the invasion of
Norway and Denmark). German troops landed at 0415 on the
morning of 9 April 1940. Norwegian neutrality had come to
19

an abrupt end, and the British move designed to "violate"
Norway's neutrality had been preempted. Neither the Allies
nor the Germans could allow this area to remain neutral.
Norwegian forces were eventually withdrawn, together with a
British contingent from north Norway. Norway itself was
governed as a conquered province while the legitimate





Norway had seen the failure of its policy of
neutrality. In December 1940, Trygve Lie, the Norwegian
Foreign Minister, made intimations to the British Foreign
Office, suggesting that "states bordering on the North
Atlantic had vital defense interests in common and
therefore ought to act together in peace time for the
protection of those interests. "*•> These ideas were
broadcast in a speech to Norway on 15 December 1940 and
"represented a complete break with Norway's non-aligned
past. "2° It was envisioned that this policy of
cooperation would include both the U.S. and Britain. It
came to embody Norway's "Atlantic Policy." As Professor
Arne Ording, an adviser and chief architect of Lie's
policies, said, "it was an attempt to nail the Anglo-Saxon
great pov/ers to their responsibilities in Europe." In an
address to the House of Commons, Trygve Lie reiterated his
20

call for an "Atlantic Association" and projected such a
grouping as a possible nucleus for a collective security
scheme
.
The British and Americans were not enthusiastic about
this proposed arrangement for the post war world. Fears
concerning Soviet responses were partially laid to rest as
a result of talks between Stalin and British Foreign
Secretary Anthony Eden. Stalin appeared to think in terms
of "spheres of influence", which seemed to "envisage both a
British centered military alliance in North Western Europe
and British naval bases in Norway and Denmark, as a
counterpart to territorial adjustments and security
arrangements for the Soviet Union along its Western
frontiers . " 27
In May 1942 the Norwegian cabinet issued a public
document entitled "Principal Features of Norwegian Foreign
Policy." This document formally endorsed Norway's
"Atlantic Policy" and stated that "until it becomes
possible to create an effective and universal League of
Nations, Norway will be compelled to seek security in
regional arrangements." 28
In January 1944 a change of emphasis occurred. First
priority was now given to the universalist concept of the
United Nations. This shift may have reflected a growing
responsiveness to Soviet concern and interest. In
21

April 1943 the Norwegian government-in-exile had received a
message from the Soviet ambassador cautioning that Norway
should make sure of a good relationship with the Soviet
Union, which was also a power with Atlantic
interests. 29 In addition, Norway now encountered a
refusal on the part of America and Britain to send an
expeditionary force to assist in Norway's liberation and it
appeared that the Soviets would be the first Allied troops
on Norwegian soil. The other Allies did not desire to send
forces to Norway to offset the Soviet presence.
On 18 October 1944 Russian forces crossed into Northern
Norway and from this point on the prevailing mood in the
Norwegian government was one of "disillusionment with the
Western powers and deep suspicion of Soviet aims in the
North. "3 Norway returned to a formal policy of
non-alignment in 1945. The Germans practiced a policy of
scorched earth as they retreated from the North and on
5 May 1945 the German occupation forces in Germany
surrendered. Concern over the removal of Russian troops
and the Soviet demand issued by Soviet Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav Molotov issued in late 1944 that the Spitzbergen
Treaty be revised to reflect a "condominium" with Norway
ovel: Svalbard and that Bear Island be ceded to the Soviets
dominated Norwegian thought. The Soviet demand was based
on Svalbard • s use during the war. 31 The weak Norwegian
position necessitated the issuance of a joint secret
22

declaration on 9 April 1945 and the opening of formal talks
with the Russians, which were eventually terminated in
1947. 32 (Svalbard will be further discussed in
Chapter V.) The last Soviet troops withdrew from Norway on
25 September 1945. The last American force in the country
(a listening post on Jan Mayen Island) was not withdrawn
until 1946.
D. POST WAR YEARS
"The five Nordic countries (see Figure 2) emerged from
World War II in widely differing political and economic
positions and having undergone contrasting experiences.
This combined with international developments during the
first post war years... n33 is credited with being the
cause of the different approaches taken towards security by
the Nordic countries. This will be examined in regard to
Norway for whom the creation of the United Nations appeared
to answer Norway's security problems and seemed to be
compatible with Norway's view of neutrality and world wide
cooperation.
^
Norway emerged from the war without a staggering
national deficit due to the revenues obtained from the use
of its Merchant Marine by the Allies during the war.
However, Norway still faced enormous reconstruction tasks
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Figure 2 . Map of Scandinavia
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build up Norwegian armed forces to a level sufficient to
ensure Norwegian neutrality.
In the initial post war years, the United States
emphasis had been on Europe solving its own security
delemma; but, as the "Cold War" emerged, the call came "to
stand up and be counted in the struggle with Soviet
Communism."^ 5 This was in juxtaposition to the
Norwegian policy of "bridge building," which assumed that
Great Power disputes were "a result of a lack of confidence
and misunderstandings."-^
Norway's policy of bridge building had as its goals the
strengthening of the international system, making
collective security work by facilitating Great Power
cooperation and the keeping of Northern Europe free from
Great Power rivalry and tension. These goals were to be
implemented by not entering into a political or military
alliance with any country, by refraining from introducing
complicated issues upon which the great powers disagreed to
international forums (e.g., the question of the fate of
Jews in post war Europe) and by avoiding action that might
cast doubt upon Norway's impartiality towards and
independence of the Great Powers. This desire to avoid
actions which might bring about Soviet displeasure was seen
as the reason for the cancellation of a visit by Winston
Churchill to Norway as a result of his "iron curtain"
speech in Fulton, U.S.A. in March 1946. The invitation,
25

extended by the King, had been accepted, yet within a month
after the speech it was announced the visit was off.- 7
Norway initially sought post war security in the United
Nations. "Participation in the United Nations in 19 45 was
not understood to involve a complete abandonment of neutral-
ity. The United Nations was an international organization
not an alliance and because it was an international organi-
zation, membership in it was appropriate to noncommit-
ted nations desirous of remaining outside Big Power
conflicts." 38
Given the blatant disregard for Norway's neutrality,
the wartime experience convinced the Norwegians that
neutrality itself would not deter an aggressor and thus
Norway searched for a new security policy. With such
events as the refusal of the East Europeans to participate
in the Marshall Plan, the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, the
first Berlin crisis, and Soviet pressure on Finland,
collective security in some form of alliance again became
appealing. Unfortunately, the United Nations had failed to
live up to Norway's hope as a viable form of collective
security.
At this point Norway had also received reports from
Helsinki, Warsaw, and Moscow that Norway might soon be
faced with a request from the Soviet Union to negotiate a
pact with the Soviet Union similar to the Soviet-Finnish





light of these reports a resolution of the security dilemma
in the North became even more important.
E. A SCANDINAVIAN PACT
As early as May 1945 the Swedish Prime Minister, at a
meeting of Scandinavian Labour Party delegates, proposed a
regional defense league under United Nations auspices.
This proposal met with little success. When, in
December 1947, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin
issued a call for the countries of Western Europe to unite
against the Soviet threat, Sweden became concerned
regarding the possibility of changes in the balance of
power in Northern Europe if Norway and Denmark entered into
alliance with the West. The Swedish Foreign Minister thus
on 3 May 1948 proposed a Scandinavian Defense Pact based on
neutrality. In September 1948 a joint defense committee of
the Scandinavian countries was set up to examine the
possibility of a Scandinavian association independent of
the West.
Within the United States and Britain it was feared that
a "neutral Scandinavian arrangement could be forced by the
Soviet Union to grant concessions which would jeopardize
Atlantic lines-of-communication as well as the security of
the British Isles." 40 The Scandinavian countries dis-
agreed over the essential characteristics of the proposed
association. Norway and Denmark were leaning towards an
27

alliance with ties to the Western powers that would be
strong enough to prevent a war, but in the event a war did
come, the ties would be strong enough to offer protection
to small as well as large powers. However, Sweden con-
tinued to emphasize her position of neutrality by stating
that Sweden must be free "to choose the road of neutrality"
and "not to join any great power bloc, either by a specific
treaty or alliance or by silent acquiesence in joint
military measures in the event of a conflict." 41 The
Norwegians had called for joint staff talks with the West
which the Swedes adamantly refused, insisting the proposed
alliance must be neutral rather than linked to any power
bloc.
The United States came out at this time against a
Scandinavian Defense Pact and asserted that military
assistance would be directly linked to stronger ties to the
emerging "Atlantic Alliance." As the amount of United
States military supplies available was limited, the State
Department in September 1948 announced that "those
countries that joined the common Atlantic effort would be
served first." 4 This was even more evident in
NSC 28/1, which was approved on 4 September 1948. It
halted arms sales to Norway and Denmark pending the outcome
of base negotiations for Spitzbergen and Greenland. Sales
were resumed to Norway on 4 December 1948 after the Joint
Chiefs of Staff reported Spitzbergen was not required as a
28

base. This "arms argument" served as a handy instru-
ment and allowed pressure to be applied to ensure Norway
made the correct choice. Norway's final decision en the
abandonment of neutrality was also influenced by a belief
that outside military aid was required if Scandinavian
defenses were to be built up to an adequate level. The
Norwegians doubted the capacity of the Swedish armament
industry to fulfill this need. Additional "incentives"
were provided through the use of economic aid to entice and
reward cooperation. Norway and Denmark received 20 million
dollars each in the quarter April-July 1948, while Sweden
as the most "recalcitrant" and uncooperative Scandinavian
country received nothing. 44 During this same period,
the need for basing forces within Norway had been dis-
cussed, and the Norwegians received assurances that bases
would not be necessary. With this in mind Norway actively
sought further information on the proposed "Atlantic
Alliance.
"
On this scene the first of the Soviet notes concerning
Norwegian participation in the proposed alliance arrived.
Norway was warned concerning the establishment of foreign
bases on its soil by Soviet diplomatic notes on
29 January 1949 and again on 5 February 1949, with the
additional offer of a Non-Aggression Pact between Norway
and the Soviet Union. Norway responded that:
29

"...forced by the disappointing performance of the
United Nations to seek increased security through
regional cooperation, it had looked into the
possibilities of a northern defense union without
positive result and now intended to investigate more
the matter of participation in a regional security
system comprising countries on the Atlantic." 45
In addition, Norway issued a unilateral statement saying
that Norway would "never lend itself or its territory to a
policy of aggression, nor would it grant bases for foreign
armed forces as long as Norway was not attacked or threat-
ened." 4 ^ Subsequent statements by the Norwegian
government repeatedly emphasized the unilateral character
of this statement and stated Norway's right to decide for
itself when it was threatened and to allow the preposition-
ing of equipment and efforts to ensure a rapid reinforce-
ment in time of crisis.
The question of the Scandinavian countries partici-
pating in the emerging Atlantic Alliance became much more
complex in January and February 1949. The Prime Ministers,
Foreign Ministers, and Defense Ministers of Norway, Denmark
and Sweden met in Karlstad, Sweden on 5 and 6 January 1949
to discuss the possibility of a Scandinavian Defense
League. Numerous prior meetings had been held and the
report of the Defense Committee appointed in September 1948
was discussed at this meeting. 47 The report high-
lighted the point of view that a common military effort
would substantially increase the defensive power of the
30

three countries through a widening of the strategic
area, preparatory planning and a standardization of
equipment. The report also stressed that for a credible
defense it was an absolute prerequisite that there be a
substantial rearmament of Norway and Denmark, and that it
would be necessary to obtain military equipment from
countries outside the Scandinavian area on favorable
economic terms. The report did not assume that Scandinavia
would automatically be involved in a Great Power conflict,
but did emphasize that without outside military assistance
the Scandinavian alliance would not be able to hold off an
aggressor for any length of time. 4 ^
The Swedes insisted that no steps be taken which might
compromise the neutral policy^, which had brought them
alone of the Scandinavian countries unscathed through six
years of war in Europe. The Norwegians were equally
insistent that no alliance be formed on terms which would
make American military supplies unavailable in an
emergency. The Swedish additionally proposed a joint
strategic planning board and program, the standardization
of all types of war materials, the creation of unifoed
forces for certain areas (0resund, Skagerak, Kattegat and
the Swedish-Norwegian border) , and the unification of the
three air forces. The Norwegians refused as the Swedish
proposal precluded any association with a North Atlantic
Pact and applied only to the metropolitan territory of an
31

ally and not to overseas territories such as Greenland or
Spitzbergen. 50 The alliance v/ould have had to reir.ain
neutral unless directly attacked.
Norway and Denmark had told Sweden in January 19 4 9 that
their "agreement in principle" to a Scandinavian pact was
conditional on the United States agreeing to furnish arms
to the members of the pact. In an attempt to clarify this
point Norwegian Foreign Minister Kalvard M. Lange visited
Washington in February 19 49 and was told in substance that
"an unattached Scandinavian Defense Union could not expect
political or military support from the [United States]
government and that Norwegian participation in the Atlantic
Pact would not involve requests to establish joint or
United States bases on Norwegian soil." 5 -'- In light of
the Norwegian desire for a guarantee of military supplies,
and a Swedish refusal to compromise and give up a chance to
stay out of war before the threat of involvement actually
developed, negotiations for a Scandinavian pact fell apart
and each country went its own way.-1 ^
F. MEMBERSHIP IN NATO
The change from neutrality to alliance was considered
so significant that the Norwegian government sought
approval before even opening negotiations to join the
proposed "Atlantic Alliance." On 3 March 1949 the Storting
met in secret session and voted 13 in favor of membership
32

and 13 opposed. In addition, the Soviets were told of the
government's opinion that "there was no need to duplicate-
pledges of non-aggression both nations had given in sub-
scribing to the United Nations Charter." 53 Norway then
entered into formal negotiations, which culminated in the
signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C. on
4 April 1949.
G. SUMMARY
"For the Norwegian decision to reject non-alignment in
favor of NATO membership, the Soviets have only themselves
to blame." 54 The experience of the war had conditioned
the Norwegians to change, but it was the Berlin blockade;
the coup in Czechoslovakia; and especially, the Soviet
pressure on Finland, which was forced in April 1948 to
accept a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual
Assistance with the Soviet Union, that crystalized
Norwegian resolve. These events, coupled with the reports
of an impending request on Norway for a treaty with the
Soviet Union similar to Finland's, provided the spark for
change. In addition, Norway had come to realize that she
"could not opt out of the international power game." 56
"Because of the strategically important location of
northern Norway, a possible conflict between the Soviet
Union and the Western powers was seen to make pre-emptive
moves against her (Norwegian) territory very likely,
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regardless of Norway's own policies."" Adam Ulam, in
Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy,
1917-1973 , explains the Soviet failure to react strongly
to Norwegian NATO membership as a result of the Soviet
leadership's preoccupation with eastern and southeastern
Europe. Stalin may also have failed to anticipate the
increasing strategic importance of this area and its future
growth as a focus of Soviet naval and strategic power.
Over time the area's strategic significance has increased
rather than diminished. 58 Thus membership in NATO
remains even more vital and is reflected as one of the
"cornerstones" of Norwegian foreign policy. The launching
of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 consolidated the
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III. SOVIET AND NORWEGIAN FORCES
A. BACKGROUND
As French diplomat Jules Cambon once said, "The geo-
graphical position of a nation ... is the principal factor
conditioning a country's foreign policy - the principal
reason why it must have a foreign policy at all." 59
This is particularly true in Norway's case. It was
Norway's geographical position which largely led to her
entry into NATO. With her entry into NATO, Norway, despite
her reservations on the stationing of foreign troops or the
presence of nuclear weapons on her territory, assumed the
role as guardian of NATO's Northern Flank.
Norway was secure in her role of Guardian initially
because of the United States monopoly on atomic weapons and
the promise of rapid reinforcement by sea from Norway's
NATO Allies. The unchallenged naval might of the United
States supplemented by that of the United Kingdom guar-
anteed the safety of the vital North Atlantic sea lines-of-
communication (SLOC) and the ability of Norway's NATO
Allies to reinforce Norway in time of crisis.
The Soviet Northern Fleet emerged from World War II as
the smallest of the Soviet's four fleets and did not
present the same threat it does today. It is today the
largest and most powerful of the Soviet Fleets. The United
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States no longer holds a nuclear monopoly and Soviet naval
capabilities have grown significantly in the last twenty
years. In addition, when discussing threats to Norway, the
Soviet Baltic Fleet and those of its Warsaw Pact Allies,
Poland and East Germany in particular, must be considered.
For the Soviet Baltic Fleet to reach and participate in a
battle for the Atlantic, the Soviets must seize control of
the Danish Straits. This would necessitate the seizure or
destruction of the airfields and harbors in the southern
part of Norway. Thus, the threat to Norway is larger than
that represented by the Soviet forces on the Kola
Peninsula.
B. THE SOVIET UNION'S POSTURE
Despite the Soviet Union's massive size, it has a
distinct disadvantage as a sea power in that its access to
the high seas is dependent on passage through straits to
the open sea. These straits leading to and from the Soviet
naval ports on the Pacific, the Black Sea, and the Baltic
Sea can be covered with detection devices to observe and
track Soviet ship movements, controlled or even blocked in
the event of war. This raises the question of why the
Soviet Union would install such a crucial strategic asset
(the Northern Fleet with its large proportion of the Soviet
SSBN Fleet) on a largely icebound peninsula, contiguous to
a NATO member capable of monitoring fleet movements and at
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the end of sea lanes choked by NATO Territory. 60 This
situation is compounded by the fact' that despite the
warming influence of the Gulf Stream, which maintains
Murmansk ice free year round, the Arctic ice-pack (which
never closes closer than 360 miles) and the seasonal winter
ice force some channelization of the Soviet fleet as it
moves toward the open sea. This egress to the Atlantic
must cross three possible choke points: (1) Norway's North
Cape - Spitzbergen Island (v/inter ice here could force
units even closer to the Norwegian coast); (2) Greenland -
Jan Mayen Island - Lofoten Islands; and (3) Greenland -
Iceland - United Kingdom (G-I-UK Gap)
.
The coast of the Kola Peninsula is ice free all year as
'far east as Svyatoy Nas and is the only coast in the
European Soviet Union with direct access to the sea. This
explains the Soviet use of the Kola Peninsula - it is
better than any other available alternative and with its
relatively free access to the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans it
also satisfies distance requirements to patrol and target
areas. In addition, the NATO members or the Nordic
Countries have adopted policies to reassure the Soviet
Union (restrictions on basing and nuclear weapons) of the
defensive nature of the alliance and the lack of threat to
Soviet interests. This area has maintained a relatively
low state of tension and proven more stable than the
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Southern Flank. By being on the flank it has avoided
NATO's preoccupation with the Central Front. 61
The Soviets have developed a large military complex
centered along the Murmansk Fjord with the chief base of
the Northern Fleet at Polyarny. There are repair
facilities located at Rosta, production facilities for
ballistic missile submarines at Severomarsk, and a
submarine yard at Severodvinsk (which has been claimed to
have an annual output equal to that of all American
submarine building facilities combined) .^ 2
Accompanying the increase in military facilities the
population of the Kola Peninsula has tripled since World
War II, and Murmansk has become the world's largest city
north of the Arctic Circle. Murmansk serves as the
terminus of a 90 mile railroad from Lennigrad and has
become a vital unloading and transshipment point. The
entire peninsula has undergone a period of industrial,
economic and military development. A modernized canal
linking the Baltic and White Sea's (see Figure 3) is
capable of transferring surface or submarine units with a
displacement of up to 5,200 tons, which means that ships of
the KRESTA Class (5,000 ton displacement) can utilize the
canal. NATO officials assume that destroyers of the
KRIVAK, KASHIN, KELDIN and KANIN Classes and ballistic
missile boats of the HOTEL, WHISKEY and GOLF Classes would
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be able to utilize the canal without being subject to
direct NATO observation. 63
Figure 3. White Sea - Baltic Canal
In addition to this area's military value to the Soviet
Union, it is a significant economic center for the Soviets.
It provides twenty per cent of the Soviet Union's fish
products. The peninsula contains copper, nickel and
uranium and has the necessary infrastructure to process
these ores. The lumber industries produce paper pulp,
turpentine, resin, cellulose, building materials and
prefabricated houses. In addition, Murmansk straddles two
oceans - the Atlantic and the Arctic. With the use of
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icebreakers there is also the Northern Sea Route (NOSERO)
,
which runs from Murmansk on the Barents Sea across the top
of Russia to Provideniya on the Bering Sea. Unfortunately,
this route is open only a few months a year and requires
icebreakers to complete. 6 ^
The most significant change in the north, though, has
been the rapid growth of Soviet military capability in the
area. The Soviet military buildup is most dramatically
displayed by the change of the Soviet Navy from a coastal
defense force at the end of World War II to the powerful
global force of tcday. The latter part of this growth is
illustrated in Table I. 65 This growth reflects the
changing strategic situation in the north and the dual
function of the Northern Fleet as the primary threat to the
NATO sea lines-of-communication and the main component of
the strategic submarine force of the Soviet Union.
Michael MccGwire has stated that "the Soviet Navy's
most important mission is the contribution it makes to the
Soviet long range nuclear strike capability." 66 Since
the Northern Fleet is the only Soviet Fleet with an
unimpeded access to the open ocean, it comes as no surprise
that 65 per cent of the Soviet strategic missile carrying
submarines and 60 per cent of the nuclear-powered
submarines are stationed here. 67 The Northern Fleet
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The most noteworthy event on the Northern Flank has
been the increase in the range of Soviet SLBMs. 69 The
result of this increase in range has been to chance the
Norwegian and Barents Sea from transit routes to firing
positions for the YANKEE Class Submarines to patrol and
firing positions for the DELTA and TYPHOON Class
Submarines. No longer is it necessary for the Soviet SSBN
force to run the G-I-UK Gap (see Figure 4) . NATO had
sought to exploit this geographic choke point by forming a
series of anti-submarine barriers composed of underwater
acoustic sensors (Sound Surveillance System) (SOSUS)
,
maritime surveillance aircraft, surface naval vessels and
attack submarines (see Figure 5) . 70 The extended
ranges were a result of a desire not to increase the
operating areas of their SSBN force but rather a desire to
protect it from NATO (primarily the United States) ASW
forces and locate it where its forces could be supported by
Soviet Naval Aviation. 71 Thus, the Norwegian Sea and
Barents Sea have, in the words of Michael MccGwire, become
"SSBN bastions." 72
Accompanying these changes in the Soviet SSBN force has
been an increase in the Soviet Union's ability to contest
western naval power- as a result of qualitative improvements
in both the Soviet Surface Force and its attack submarines.
These improvements have been accomplished primarily by the










































In recent years, the Northern Fleet has seen the intro-
duction of the nuclear powered KIROV Class Cruiser, the
KRASINA Class Cruiser, the KIEV Class Guided Missile
Aircraft Carrier, and the UDALOY and SOVREMENNY Class
Destroyers. In addition, the IVAN ROGOV Class Amphibious
Assault Ship, the ALFA Class SSN, and the OSCAR Class SSBN
were introduced first to the Northern Fleet. In total, the
Northern Fleet encompasses approximately 60 ships
including nearly 70 major surface combatants and 13 attack
submarines. 7 ^
The Kola Peninsula is an important early warning and
defense area. It houses a large number of radar
installations, ground-to-air missiles and interceptor
aircraft. The region's air defense forces include more
than 200 interceptors (over 100 of these are stationed on
the peninsula itself) and some thirty ground-to-air missile
stations (SA-2, SA-3 , and SA-5) with more than 20
launchers.
No fighter-bomber aircraft are permanently deployed to
air bases on the Kola Peninsula. The tactical aircraft on
the peninsula belong to the Frontovaya Aviatsia and include
two squadrons of reconnaissance aircraft (MIG-21 FISHBED
and MIG-25 FOXBAT) located at the top of the panhandle.
There are a total of 16 airfields with runways of 2,000
meters. Eight of these are operated by the Air Defense
Force (PVO-strany) of the Archangelsk Air Defense District.
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The 13th Tactical Air Army of the Leningrad Military
District includes 120 fighters (fighter-bombers and
reconnaissance aircraft) and some 20 helicopters and
transport aircraft. The Leningrad Military District
includes a Long Range Aviation component of some dozen
medium bombers, In addition, the perimeter acquisition
radars for the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system deployed
around Moscow are situated here. 74
The Naval Air Force of the Northern Fleet is composed
of 250 aircraft, including 65 subsonic bombers, an equal
number of long range reconnaissance aircraft, as well as
anti-submarine v/arfare aircraft, helicopters and
transports. Soviet air capability in. the Northern Theater
is shown in Figure 6.
Three Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) bases
are located around Kandalakska and equipped with nine SS-5
"SKEAN" launchers. With a range of 2,500 nautical miles
they are most likely targeted outside the Scandinavian
area. These rockets could be replaced by the SS-20 rocket.
SS-20 rockets on the European continent with their range of
3,500 nautical miles can easily strike Scandinavian
targets.
The ground forces on the Kola Peninsula have remained
fairly stable over time. 75 The ground forces on the
Kola Peninsula consist of two Motorized Rifle Divisions
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Figure 6. Soviet Air Capability in the Northern Theater
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341st MRD at Kandalakska. Each of the divisions has more
than 12,0 00 men and around 20 tanks. The support units
include one missile brigade of SCUD and FROG Launchers.
These missiles are capable of carrying both nuclear and
chemical warheads and are part of a Soviet modernization
program. The SS-23 missile with a range of 30 miles is
replacing the 180 mile SCUD Missile and the SS-21 missile
with a range of 75 miles is replacing the 45 mile range
FROG Missile. 7 *> The coverage of the Nordic area by
NATO and Soviet missiles is shown in Figure 7. Additional
divisional support units include one Artillery Brigade (122
and 152mm) and one Air Defense Regiment (SA-4) . There is
also the 63rd "Kirkenes" Marine Infantry Regiment at
Pechenga with about 1,90 men. The peacetime strength is
on the order of 30,000 to 40,000 men. All units are in
Category I as first line Soviet divisions maintaining full
equipment and 85 per cent or more of their wartime
establishment. 77
The divisions of the Kola Peninsula are subordinate to
the 6th Army Headquarters at Pelrozavodsk . Six Motorized
Rifle Divisions of lower readiness are found in the
Leningrad Military District (LMD) . Two of these are
located around Archangelsk and the other four are located
further south. Strategic reserves may be drawn from the
Oral, Volga, Moscow and Kiev Military Districts when




























Motorized Rifle Divisions of the Leningrad Military
District do not appear to have an offensive thrust. They
are equipped with old T-54/55 tanks rather than the new
T-64 tank, with the BRT-60 armored personnel carriers
rather than the new BMP, and they rely on towed rather than
self-propelled artillery.
In addition to these forces, the Soviets are able to
call on the assistance of their Warsaw Pact allies for
operations against the Danish Straits and Southern Norway.
The Soviet Baltic Fleet would be supplemented by the navies
of both Poland and the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
.
This creates an impressive force capable of extensive
amphibious operations with a naval infantry force of about
10,000 men. Despite only having landing craft to
accommodate half of these forces, with the use of merchant
marine forces, which are subject to Soviet Armed Forces
control and use, this problem can be overcome. In addition
to these forces, the Soviets have six GOLF-II Class
Ballistic Missile Submarines equipped with three SS-N-5
SERB Nuclear Missiles with a range of approximately 850
miles stationed in the Baltic.
As John Erickson has commented on the growth of Soviet
power in the North:
"The result of this military, industrial, and
political activity has been to implant one of the
strongest — possibly the strongest — complex of bases
in the world in the immediate neighborhood of Norway,
housing strategic forces capable of and committed to
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operating far beyond the Soviet periphery plus tactical
forces deployed to protect these bases and embodying
the capability of seizing and holding any appreciable





Norwegian Defense Policy has rested upon four major
themes
:
(1) NATO Membership is necessary as Norway recognizes
it is unable to defend itself by national means
alone.
(2) Security reflects a balance of insurance
(deterrence) and reassurance. (These will be
discussed in the following chapter.)
(3) Linkage of Norwegian Security to Europe's Security
is a means of preserving a low military posture in
Northern Europe.
(4) A credible organization for reinforcement is a
necessity. This reflects a belief that security is
better served by contingency plans than by the
actual deployment of forces to Norway. '^
Norway believes that the Soviet military concentration at
Murmansk is part of the global competition between the
superpowers rather than a force directed mainly at
Norway. 80 Within this context Norwegian Defense Policy
is a combination of both "deterrence" and "reassurance,"
whereby Norway's primary objective is to attempt to prevent
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the achievement of a quick outcome in a war and thus
prevent a fait accompli thus ensuring NATO's reinforcements
can be deployed in time to have an effect on the outcome of
the war.
Norwegian Armed Forces are structured with this
objective in mind. The Armed Forces are organized under
the Minister of Defense. Beneath him is the Chief of
Defense (CHOD) . From here the chain of command goes to the
Inspector Generals of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Home
Guard. As Chiefs of their respective services, the
Inspector Generals are responsible for training, tactics
and supply. Operationally, Norway is divided into separate
Northern and Southern Commands, which in time of war, would
come under the NATO Commander in Chief, Northern Europe
(CINC NORTH) . The exact composition of each component
branch is contained in Table II.
(1) Army - The Army includes 24,000 men, of whom 17,80
are conscripts. A reduced battalion of 450 men is
garrisoned at the border in Kirkenes. Another battalion of
1,000 men is located in the Lakselv Area. The Northern
Brigade, composed of 4,000 men and a squadron of LEOPARD
Medium Tanks, is deployed in the Trans-Skiboth Valley Area.
An infantry company is posted to Bodo to protect COMNOR
Headquarters. The rest of the Army's forces are located in




COMPOSITION OF NORWAY'S MILITARY
Population: 4,100,000
Military Service: Army 12, Navy and
Air Force 15 months
Total Armed Forces: 42,100
{28,300 conscripts)
GO? 1981: kr 283.36 billion
(S49.37 billion)
Defense Expenditure 1981: kr 9.45 billion
(SI. 65 billion); NATO definition not
available
GDP Growth 1980: 3 .8%
Inflation: 13.7% (1980), 11.9% (1981)
SI = 5.739 kroner (1931)
ARMY: 24,400 (17,800 conscripts)
1 brigade group of 2 infantry battalion
1 tank company, 1 special field corr.pa
1 AA battery ( North" Norway
)
1 all-arms group; 1 infantry battalions
1 tank company, 1 special field compa
1 AA battery (South Norway)
Independent armed squadrons, infantry
ba.talions, and artillery regiments
73 Leopard 1; 38 M-48 MBT;
_
70 NM-116 IM
90) light tanks; M-113 APC; 2 50 lC5mm
155mm howitzer; 130 M-109 155mm speci
nowitzer; 107mm mortar; Carl Gustav 8
106mm RCL; ENTAC , TOW ATGW; Rh-202 20
40mm AA guns; RBS-70 SAM; 24 0-1E










Reserves: 122,000: 4 divisions; 11 Regimental
Combat Teams (brigades) of about 5,000 men
each, 5PT units and territorial forces;
21 days refresher training each 3rd/4th
year. Home Guard (all services) 85,000
(90 davs initial service).
NAVY: 9,400, including 1,600 coast artillery
(6,100 conscripts)
14 Type 207 submarines
5 Oslo frigates with 6 Penguin SSM, 1x3 Sea
Sparrow SAM
2 Sleipner corvprr.ea
i-i FAC(M) with Penguin SSM: 19 Storm,
14 Hawk, 6 Snogg
3 Tj>ld FAC(T)(m reserve)
1 Vadso patrol craft
2 Vidar minelayers, 9 ex-U.S. MSC-60
minesweepers, 1 minehunter
1 Horten depot ship
7 LSM: 2 Kvalsund, 5 Reinoysund
40 coast artillery batterys: 75mm, 105mm,
127mm, 150mm guns
Bases: Horten, Gergen, Ramsund, Tromso
Reserves: 16,000. Coastguard established
as part of Navy; 3 Nordcap patrol vessels
with 6x1 Penguin 11 SSM, 6 Lynx helicopter.
AIR FORCE: 3,300 (5,000 conscripts";
114 combat aircraft
4 FGA squadrons: 3 with 51 F-5A; 1 with
16 CF -104G D, 2 TF-104B
1 interceptor squadron with 15 F-16A
1 reconnaissance flight with 6 RF-5A
1 MR squadron with 7 P-3B
1 OCU with 13 F-5B, 4 F-16B
1 ASW helicopter squadron with 6 Lynx
! coastguard
)
2 transport squadrons: 1 with 6 C-130H,
3 Falcon 20S; 1 with 4 DHC-6 aircraft,
8 UH-1B helicopter
1 SAR helicopter squadron with 10 Sea King
MK 4 3
2 utility helicopter squadrons with 26 UH-11
16 Safari training aircraft
AAM: Sidewinder. ASM: Bullpup.
4 light AA battalions with L/70 40mm guns
1 SAM battalion (4 batteries) with
128 Nike Hercules
(On order: 44 F-16A, 3 F-16B fighters;
RBS-7 SAM; Penguin 111 ASM)
Reserves: 20,000. 7 light AA battalions
for airfield defense with L/60 40mm guns.
FORCES ABROAD: Lebanon (UNIFIL):





and trained. When fully mobilized, Norway can field 13
infantry brigades.
(2) Air Force - Currently the Air Force consists of a
mixture of 114 old and new combat aircraft. Three
squadrons with a total of 51 F-5A's are being phased out
and replaced with F-16A's. One squadron with F-16A*s is
currently operational. The total number of aircraft, when
rephased, will drop to a level of 72 F-16's, which will
fill both the fighter and attack role. These moves are to
be coupled with efforts to equip airfields with modern
anti-aircraft systems. 81
(3) Navy - Naval assets consist of 14 KOBBEN Type 207
Submarines. Some of these units will be modernized, some
retired, and some will be replaced by six new submarines to
be purchased from West Germany. The Navy also contains
five OSLO Class Frigates, two SLEIPNER Class Corvettes and
four active squadrons of Fast Patrol Boats (FPB's) equipped
with PENQUIN Surface-to-Surf ace Missiles. It should be
noted the creation of a Norwegian 20 mile economic zone
has created enforcement problems which have affected the
Navy. A Coast Guard has competed with the Navy for scarce
funds. The coastal fortresses controlling guns, torpedo




(4) Home Guard - This force consists of 85,000
personnel who have undergone training and maintain their
weapons and uniforms at home and are available for
immediate call up and use in local areas.
(5) Civil Defense - Norway maintains a Civil Defense
Program which consists of emergency training, required
shelters, and plans for the evacuation of urban population
centers.
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, there is a
large asymmetry in the standing forces of the North. How
then is Norway able to maintain her position with regard to
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IV. DETERRENCE AND REASSURANCE
A. NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICV
With the large disparity in forces in the North, the
Norwegian Government has stated, "The primary aim of our
security policy is to prevent war and to protect our sover-
eignty, our freedom of action, and the right to determine
our own society." 83 Within this guideline the addi-
tional objective has been established to, "...contribute to
peaceful relations between nations." 84 In order to
fulfill these goals in the post war years. Norway changed
from a policy of neutrality and bridgebuilding to a policy
of alignment in the form of NATO Membership. This alliance
membership has led to the creation of Norway's Policy of
"Deterrence and Reassurance." NATO Membership is viewed as
a purely defensive measure and by following a policy of
"reassurance." Norway attempts to indicate this to the
Soviet Union.
B. NATO AND SOVIET CALCULATIONS
In the event of a great power conflict, the area of
northern Norway would have significant value to both sides.
For both sides it would be of paramount importance to
prevent the other side from taking advantage of the area.
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For NATO the North Cape area serves at least as a forward
observation post. 85 From the Soviet viewpoint, they
would desire to conduct a preemptive attack in order to
accomplish the following objectives:
(1) obtain the use of Norwegian airfields and
fjords; 86
(2) prevent the use of the Norwegian Sea by forces
hostile to the Soviet Union; 87
(3) interdict NATO's sea lines-of-communication;
(4) protect, support and carry out amphibious
operations against other strategic areas (i.e., the
Central Front)
;
(5) prevent the use of Norway as an offensive bridge-
head against Soviet forces or territory; and
(6) enhance Soviet Strategic Ballistic Missile
p pSubmarine offense and defense. 00
Present Soviet naval and air capabilities are more than
sufficient for defense of local sea areas in the Barents
and Baltic Seas, but extending these defenses westward and
providing operational freedom for surface forces in the
North Atlantic would require prior neutralization of NATO
air forces and air fields and Soviet control of Northern
Norway. Thus, a preemptive move against Norway would allow
the Soviets to utilize Norway's 1,647 mile coast line (if
fjords are included, Norway's convoluted coast line jumps
to over 13,000 miles) for naval bases and with the
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utilization of Norwegian air fields would greatly extend
Soviet capability for sea control, SSBN defense, and the
ability to interdict vital sea lines. 89 Thus, "the
strategic value of North Norway is not therefore connected
with membership in NATO, but arises simply because of the
lie of its land and seas." 9 ^
C. DETERRENCE
Deterrence is the restraining or discouraging of a
course of action by an opponent through the use of uncer-
tainty or a fear of the consequences. As part of Norway's
security policy, deterrence is designed to inhibit the
Soviet Union and thus prevent aggression. This policy is
embodied in the actions of the Norwegians themselves and in
Norway's membership in NATO.
Norway's membership in NATO constitutes the major deter-
rence component of Norway's security posture. The credibil-
ity of this deterrent is directly related to NATO's ability
to provide adequate reinforcements in an effective and
timely manner. NATO and Norway are actively engaged in
efforts to enhance this capability. 91
1. Allied Air Reinforcements
These efforts have come to be embodied in Supreme
Allied Commander Europe's (SACEUR) Rapid Reinforcement
Program, which Norway became a participant in
December 19 82. This plan calls for the relocating of
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around 1,900 American, Canadian, and British aircraft to
Western Europe in a crisis situation. Approximately 359 cf
these aircraft are assigned to AFNORTH, with half of these
being relocated in Norway. (This does not include the 75
aircraft that will come to Norway as part of American
Marine Corps Reinforcement.)
Spare parts for Allied aircraft were stored for
Allied aircraft at Norwegian airfields in the 1950's.
These parts were destroyed as they became obsolete. In
1960, Norway concluded an agreement (INVICTUS) with the
United States regarding the storage of fuel, lubricants,
spare parts, and ammunition for maritime aircraft contrib-
uting to NATO's defense of the Trans-Atlantic sea lines-of-
communication. In 19 80, the agreement was extended to
include emergency evacuation of U.S. carrier based aircraft
to airfields in mid-Norway where fuel and equipment to
service such aircraft were to be stocked.
In 1974, Norway and the United States concluded an
agreement for the transfer of American fighter squadrons to
Norway in time of a crisis. In this regard, Norway has
eight air stations (six of these are indicated in Figure 8)
participating in NATO's Collocated Operating Bases (COB)
Programs, with plans to receive a squadron (a squadron may
vary between 18 and 24 aircraft each) . Prestocking of
ammunition, drop tanks and maintenance equipment began in
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air stations were signed. The goal was to be able to
operate the fighter aircraft for a period of seven days
after arrival in country. it should be noted that in
addition to receiving these fighter squadrons, Norway can
expect to receive a significant number of transport
aircraft, as men and supplies are airlifted to Norway.
SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Program, in addition to
American reinforcements, calls for two Canadian squadrons
of F-5's (negotiations are in progress to locate these
squadrons at Andoya Air Station) and a British Jaguar
Squadron to reinforce North Norway.
2 . Allied Ground Force Reinforcements
On 16 January 19 81 Norway and the United States
signed a Memorandum of Understanding governing the pre-
stockage and reinforcement of Norway. In accordance with
this agreement, the United States would procure the
necessary equipment to support the ground element of a
Marine Air/Ground Amphibious Brigade (MAB) , and store that
equipment in Norway. Prestocking Marine Corps equipment in
Norway and having Marines flown in by air would overcome
the problem of moving reinforcement forces by sea (a two to
three week process dependent upon warning time) and ensure
that the Marines would be available to defend the area
rather than forced to recapture it.
A MAB comprises about 10,000 men, with infantry,
artillery, and combat service support equipment. In
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addition, it comprises an Aviation Combat Force of two Air
Defense Squadrons, two Close Support Squadrons, as well as
approximately 75 Heavy Transport and Light Support
Squadrons. The equipment to be prestocked includes 24
155 mm howitzers and associated vehicles, bridging
equipment, approximately 25 trucks v/ith about 10
trailers, ammunition, fuel, and food. Several aspects of
this agreement will also be discussed in the subsequent
section on "reassurance." Norway is committed to supply
host-nation support92 and to seek through NATO
infrastructure procedures to provide adequate
prepositioning facilities.
It should be noted that the MAB is dedicated to the
reinforcement of Norway within the NATO Chain of Command.
What this means is that the "United States may provide,
consistent with SACEUR requirements, a U.S. Marine
Amphibious Brigade." 9 -^ In other words, the MAB remains
a key element of SACEUR' s flexible strategic reserves and
may in actuality be employed elsewhere. Even if deployed
to Norway, it must be at the request of the Norwegian
Government and is not automatic. Once deployed and
"married up" with their equipment in Central Norway, it is
not a foregone conclusion the MAB would be deployed to
North Norway. The Memorandum of Understanding states that
the Marines would be transported from Central Norway to
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other threatened areas in Norway. 554 The first storage
of ammunition commenced in the fall of 19 82.
In 1979, Norway concluded an agreement for storage
of oversnow vehicles for the 42nd and 45th Commando Groups
of the British Royal Marines. They are not dedicated to
the reinforcement of Norway, but could be sent to Norway by
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) in an
emergency. The Royal Marine Commandoes receive regular
training and are part of the 3rd Commando Brigade, which
also contains a company of Dutch Marines. 95
A Canadian Brigade Group is earmarked for
reinforcement of Norway and consists of about 4,000 men.
Presently only one battalion and its equipment can be
airlifted to Norway. The others must come by sea.
Negotiations concerning the prestockage of heavy equipment
for one battalion are currently in progress.
The only other force likely to be called upon to
reinforce North Norway is the Allied Command Europe (ACE)
Mobile Force. This force consists of about 4,000 men drawn
from seven nations. It would expect to be deployed to a
contingency area in advance of other reinforcements. By so
doing, it would demonstrate the solidarity and
determination of NATO to defend one of its member
countries. The force's stated prime mission is to deter
aggression by its timely deployment. The ACE Mobile Force
participates in exercises in Norway every second year and
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consists of three battalions, artillery, and support units,
as well as an air component of four squadrons of fighter
aircraft. 96 Fuel installations and other facilities
have been emplaced at Bordufoss Airfield, which is the main
reception station for the land elements of the AMF in an
emergency.
3. Allied Maritime Reinforcement:
Norway has actively participated in NATO's common
infrastructure program since 1952. This program has
included the establishment of a series of fuel and
ammunition depots for Norwegian and Allied naval forces.
Originally, Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the
United States were identified as user nations.
With the admission of West Germany to NATO, the
question of German access was raised. This question was
raised by the perception that now Southern Norway was
protected via a forward defense perimeter in the Baltic via
the forces of Denmark and West Germany. In the event of a
collapse of NATO forces in the region, Southern Norway
would serve as the evacuation point for surviving forces.
The forces would be unable to take ammunition, supplies, or
fuel and thus would be dependent upon stores within Norway.
In addition, the Norwegian Government, despite protests by
the Soviet Union, held that its relations with the Federal
Republic of Germany would be on the same level as its
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relations with other allies regarding access to common
infrastructure installations in Norway.
SACEUR concluded a Memorandum of Understanding in
1962 with the Norwegian Ministry of Defense concerning the
control, operation, and maintenance of NATO's maritime
depots in Norway. In 1964, the Royal Norwegian Navy
entered into an agreement with the West German Navy concern-
ing the storing of ammunition, fuel, and medical equipment
in Southern Norway. Construction of a large fuel depot for
NATO's maritime forces in mid-Norway at Namsenf j orden is in
progress. It will be built and operated as a fuel depot
for both civilian and military purposes.
In the event of an emergency the primary maritime
support would come from SACLANT' s' Mar itime Contingency
Force Atlantic (MARCONFORLANT) , which consists of Striking
Fleet Atlantic and amphibious forces. Striking Fleet
Atlantic may include two to five aircraft carriers with
250-450 fighter aircraft. The exact composition of this
task force^ may vary in composition depending upon
SACLANT 's ability to meet competing claims for scarce
resources and the threat to the task force's survivability
in the Northeast Atlantic. The amphibious element could
consist of the British/Dutch Commando Brigade and a Marine
Amphibious Brigade. In addition to these forces, the
Standing Naval Force Atlantic ( STAVNAVFOPLANT) could render
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assistance. It normally consists of five to eight
destroyers and is a means of demonstrating Allied might and
resolve.
4 . Allied Exercises^
NATO exercises are viewed as a means of stabilizing
the military situation, communicating a NATO commitment,
and as a form of reassurance rather than as an opportunity
to convey a special message or as a response to a specific
action or policy of the Soviet Union. Allied participation
in military exercises in Norway is seen as a means of sub-
stantiating the claim that the defense of Norway is not
only a national responsibility but a responsibility of the
entire alliance and is within the military capability of
Allied forces. Norway uses the exercises as a factor con-
tributing to the deterrence of Soviet aggression by
creating an impression that non-Norwegian forces would have
to be fought at an early stage in any conflict. Norway
also uses the exercises to show restraint and as a form of
reassurance. The role of exercises in "reassurance" will
be discussed later.
A pattern of exercises has crystalized over the
years. Within this pattern the Norwegian Northern Erigade
carries out annual exercises in the fall (BARFROST) and
winter (KALD VINTER) . The Canadian Brigade Group scheduled
to reinforce Norway in time of crisis sends a company to
participate in both exercises. The Royal Marines of the
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42nd and 45th Commando Groups undergo annual winter train-
ing (CLOCKWORK in North Norway and PENDULUM and MAINSPRING
in South Norway)
. Every second year the AMF carries cut a
major exercise (EXPRESS) in Norway. ^9
These exercises are supplemented by SACLANT's
participation in three recurring fleet exercises (NORTHERN
WEDDING, OCEAN SAFARI, and TEAMWORK) involving ocean areas
off Norway. Each exercise occurs every four years with
TEAMWORK including a phase with ground forces. The United
States Marine Amphibious Brigade and United Kingdom Royal
Commando Brigades participate in these quadrennial
exercises.
5 . Mobilization, Terrain and Climate
The Norwegians have adopted the policy that
Northern Norway can be more readily reinforced from
Southern Norway than by outside assistance. The Norwegians
estimate that within a 48 hour period that the Norwegian
Army can increase its strength in Northern Norway from one
brigade to five brigades mostly through local mobilization.
These forces would be in addition to the forces of the Home
Guard. 10 At present equipment is stored in the north
for a brigade that can be flown in from the south in under
24 hours. Present defense plans call for the preposition-
ing of the equipment for a second brigade in the north.




In addition to these forces, the countryside itself
plays a major role in the planned defense of Norway. All
routes from the Soviet Union into Norway and southwards are
channelized through valleys where steep mountainsides
prevent the outflanking of defensive positions by armor or
mechanized divisions. Ideal chokepoints for defense are
created by the meeting of Norway's deep fjords and inland
mountain ridges. Any amphibious invader would have to
penetrate fairly deep into the fjords to reach a point
where sloping beaches replace towering cliffs at the
water's edge. Wet, moorish land coupled with a lack of
roads and numerous boulders further hamper vehicle
movements. Rear Admiral Reider Berg of Norway's Northern
Command has stated that the "Terrain is our best defense
but its benefit could be overriden by surprise." 101
An additional ally reveals itself in the very
climate itself. There is no "dry cold" due to the
mediating influence of the Gulf Stream and thus a "wet
cold" - the worst condition a soldier can meet-1- 1" "• -
predominates. The climate is unforegiving and allows for
no margin of error on the part of individual or
organization. Mere survival can take the total effort of
men in this environment at times. 10 At times the
rivers and lakes are frozen hard enough to use as highways
but at other times they may merely serve as potential
traps. In summer, the days are long and there is little,
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if any, darkness to provide cover; while in winter, the
long Arctic nights of continuous darkness present another
problem in that close air support of ground forces becomes
extremely difficult. It has been said that in Norway an
all-weather fighter aircraft is all-weather only in the air
defense role. Snow reduces the effects of ordnance and one
Norwegian officer claimed that if they were to use the
close air support weapons they have in winter, they would
keep the aircraft on the ground 22 hours a day. 104
6 . Logistic Support
It is envisioned that only ten per cent of the
supplies and equipment sent to Europe in a NATO war would
go by air. The other ninety per cent must, by necessity,
come by sea. It is envisioned that the initial airlift
would be in excess of 30,000 men and 20,000 tons of
supplies. This is in addition to the 2,000 tons needed per
day to meet civilian requirements, the daily air force
requirement of 1,000 tons per day and a daily combat
requirement of 2,000 tons per day. This is a daily
requirement of 5,000 tons a day in excess of the initial
iift.i 0S
NATO does not have enough air transport available
to ensure rapid reinforcement by air, nor does Norway have
the capacity to receive a massive airlift or rapidly move
these supplies onward. Two-thirds of the bases available
are located in the south where they are distant from the
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most likely area of conflict and hence need. In the north,
only Bodo and Bardufoss are suitable for airlift purposes -
Evenes being short of parking space and Barnak too exposed.
In addition, a total reinforcement by air necessitates
control of the airspace of the intended area and places
reinforcement in a position where it is hostage to the
whims of the weather. Air reinforcement necessitates
Norway to retain both use and control of the air stations.
Norway is in the process of upgrading the defense capabil-
ities of its air stations by acquiring surface-to-air
missiles for them. It must be remembered that these fields
are sure to be a high priority for seizure or
neutralization by Soviet forces.
As regards sealift, Norway only has a single port
capable of ramp unloading of vehicles. The Soviet Union
has the largest and most diverse stock of mines in the
world and they can be deployed by aircraft, surface
warships, merchant ships, or submarines. This is further
underscored by estimates that the Soviets may have as many
as 500,000 mines in stock. Mine countermeasures are a
national responsibility to be carried out prior to the
arrival of allied reinforcements. 106 Norway has nine
minesweepers and one minehunter. These forces are of 1950
construction with the minehunter most recently modernized
in 1978. While carrying out minesweeping operations these
units will be especially vulnerable to air attack.
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The Soviets can use submarines, surface units, and
aircraft, such as the BACKFIRE bomber137 to perform the
anti-SLOC mission interdicting NATO reinforcements and
supplies enroute. While mines can be used to isolate the
landing ports, the Soviets have the capability to conduct
air or missile strikes against these terminals and their
distribution networks for the onward movement of
supplies. 108 In Norway's case, the situation is
further complicated by infrastructure problems.
The main supply routes are almost totally
restricted to the single north-south E-6 road and its
intersecting east-west secondary roads. E-6 crosses a
number of vulnerable bridges and ferries. Only one
railroad line runs north from Oslo and it ends at Bodo,
1,200 kilometers from Norway's northernmost border. The
daily requirement for the onward movement of 5,000 tons of
supplies is double the capacity of the existing road system
under favorable air defense and climatic circumstances.
The mere shipment of the supplies and
reinforcements creates a problem in and of itself. 109
The years since World War II have seen a steady decline in
the size of militarily useful dry cargo ships, which has
fallen from 2,400 to about 440 ships. The United States
can rely on six sources of ships to meet its commitment to
a sealift reinforcement of Europe. These sources are:
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(1) the Military Sealift Command (MSC) Controlled
F 1 e e t
;
(2) the United States Merchant Marine Fleet;
(3) the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF)
;
(4) the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF)
;
(5) the Effective United States Controlled (EUSC)
Fleet; and
(6) the NAT^ pool ships.
Each of these sources has its own mobilization problem.
The NSC ships are presently in use and only a small portion
could be made available on short notice. The United States
Merchant Marine Fleet has steadily declined since
World War II and these ships too are dispersed around the
world. The RRF ships have only a modest carriage capacity
in its 29 ships while 129 of the 170 NDRF ships are
remnants of the original Victory Ship Fleet built during
World War II with an average age of nearly 40 years. The
EUSC is made up of United States owned ships registered
under the flags of Honduras, Panama and Liberia. These
ships are in use world-wide, thus presenting a mobilization
problem augmented by the fact they are manned by foreign
crews who may not wish to man these ships in a crisis
situation. In addition, many of these ships are not
self-sustaining because they require cargo handling
facilities which may not be available in a crisis due to
their likelihood of becoming wartime targets.
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The last source of ships is the NATO pool. The
European NATO allies have agreed to augment United States
sealift capabilities by providing 40 high capacity liners
in a NATO mobilization situation. To ensure a prompt
availability of the 400 ships a specifically controlled
reinforcement pool of over 600 ships have been created.
These ships might not be readily available as they are
engaged in commerce and their owner nations may have other
competing mission requirements.
7 . Warning and Decisions
No matter how well coordinated or preplanned the
reinforcement of Norway is. it is dependent upon two other
factors. One is the perception that a situation exists
which calls for reinforcement, and the other factor is that
a decision to actually request forces from outside the
country must be made- Early commitment of reinforcements
thus depends on both unambiguous warning of aggression and
early political decisions by the countries concerned. NATO
ministerial guidance in 1977 directed that reinforcement
and augmentation forces should reach a potential area of
conflict before aggression takes place or depending on the
warning time given, early enough to affect the initial
course of hostilities.
It was formerly held that it would take 30 days for
the Warsaw Pact to mobilize its forces for an attack on
Western Europe and that NATO would have 23 days to mobilize
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its own forces. This was intended as a basis for calcula-
tion, not as many observers assumed, as an intelligent
prediction. 110 Today some analysts predict the Soviets
could launch an unreinforced attack on the central front
with as little as two days notice and in the case of Norway
the Soviets could launch a reinforced attack within 48
hours. An unreinforced preemptive attack is another Soviet
option in the North. 111
A decision by the Soviets to attack in any area of
NATO is likely to be made long before the actual outbreak
of hotilities. Due to the risk of escalation, 11 ^ both
horizontal and vertical, any decision would have to be
evaluated carefully and there must be a high likelihood of
victory. In order to enhance their chance of success the
Soviets can be expected to attempt to mask their prepar-
ations. They will attempt to make what was once an
anomaly, such as a surge of naval forces into the Atlantic,
into a routine pattern, such as a yearly exercise. Thus,
moderate increases in activity over a period of years or
months, or a series of training evolutions over a period of
time, could lessen the value of mass movements as an indi-
cator. The majority of the Northern Fleet could put to sea
in 48 hours. The DELTA Class SSBN can strike targets in
the United States from Murmansk and thus, need only move a
short distance to sea for dispersion. Seeking strategic
surprise, the Soviets would be willing to make some
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sacrifice and a less than fully deployed Navy is an obvious
choice. ** At present, only 15 per cent of the Soviet
SSBN force is deployed at any one time. With the collapse
of the INF talks and Soviet threats to station more
missiles at sea capable of striking the United States in
the same amount of time that NATO Pershing missiles require
to strike the Soviet Union, a change in the Soviet pattern
of SSBN deployment might be expected. To meet the time
requirement of 10 to 12 minutes the SSBNs would of
necessity be stationed much closer to the continental
United States. With this reduced range, the older Soviet
SSBNs such as the YANKEES are a natural choice.
The other factor is that, once the warning is
given, early and brave political decisions must be made.
In this instance, Norway would have to request assistance
and the other NATO allies would have to agree to commit the
requested forces. The decision to request assistance in
Norway's case would have grave political consequences,
because it would bring to an end Norway's policy of not
permitting the stationing of foreign troops on Norwegian
soil in peacetime. This ban does not apply when Norway is
attacked or threatened, thus highlighting the need for the
threat to be readily identified and understood.
During a time of rising tension a decision to ask
for reinforcements could be viewed as destabilizing, as it
could aggravate Soviet fears and thus appear provocative.
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There would be a temptation to delay implementation of
reinforcement plans in hope that the Soviets would
reevaluate the situation and unwind. To aid the Soviets,
this argument need not succeed, it need only retard NATO
actions.
The decision process in NATO is also fraught with
peril. NATO can respond on several levels - economically,
politically or militarily. Coordinated Alliance action
requires that none of the member nations objects. When
governments have divergent views, negotiations continue
until a unanimous decision is reached. For NATO as a whole
to take action, all sixteen countries would have to agree
on the most appropriate response and its implementation.
In a crisis on the Northern Flank this agreement may not be
readily available if a member hesitates to commit NATO
forces to an area where the local balance of power is so
markedly in the Soviet Union's favor. 114
This does not preclude an Alliance member from pro-
viding assistance on a national basis- In the case of the
United States, the use of U.S. Marines embarked in amphib-
ious units would have two advantages. First, because these
units would be onboard ships and not necessarily landed in
country, they might be perceived as less provocative while
still demonstrating U.S. support. Second, being onboard
ships in international waters, they do not have to be
requested by the Norwegians, nor are they subject to
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Norwegian restrictions or domestic politics. In the end,
though, all reinforcements are dependent upon the timely
receipt of warning and the implementation of the necessary
measures by the appropriate political authorities.
D. REASSURANCE
Norway has walked a fine line between prudence and
appeasement since February 1949. Norway's policy has
consistently been one of enlightened self-interest where
Norway's security was best served by taking Soviet
strategic concerns into consideration in the formation of
her various policies. This policy of reassurance has
consisted of a series of unilateral restrictions by which
the Norwegians have attempted to reduce Soviet insecurities
at having a member of a "hostile" alliance only 78 miles
from the homeport of 65 per cent of its SSBN force. The
Soviets have repeatedly tried to treat these restrictions
as bilateral agreements but Norway has consistently
reserved the right to alter these policies if Norway is
attacked or exposed to threats of attack. With a common
border of 122 miles, Norway has adopted measures to avoid
provocation, to preclude any Soviet pretext for action, and




1 . Base Policy1 1
5
When Norway was considering joining the proposed
Western Alliance, the Soviets en 29 January 10 40 sent a
diplomatic note alleging that the proposed alliance had
aggressive intentions and asking if Norway intended to join
or "undertake any obligations ... regarding the establish-
ment of air or naval bases on Norwegian territory." The
Norwegians responded to this query with a unilateral
declaration on 1 February 1949 that stated:
"Norway will never be a party to a policy with aggres-
sive intentions. It will never permit Norwegian
territory to be used in the service of a policy of this
kind. The Norwegian Government will never be a party to
any agreement with other states involving obligations on
the part of Norway to make available to the armed forces
of foreign power's bases on Norwegian territory as long
as Norway is not attacked or subject to the threat of
attack."
The Soviets responded with a second note on
5 February 1949 which offered Norway a Non-Aggression Pact
if Norway was worried about a threat from the East. Norway
responded with a statement that:
"Forced by the disappointing performance of the United
Nations to seek increased security through regional
cooperation, it had looked into the possibilities of a
northern defense union without positive result and now
intended to investigate more the matter of participation




As for the Non-Aggression Pact- Norway countered that since
both countries were members of the United Nations and
pledged to refrain from wars of aggression such a pact
would be superfluous.
The reasons for this policy were several. After
five years of German occupation the Norwegians had no
desire to have foreign troops on their soil again. Concern
over Soviet security sensitivities was part of the
calculus. Norway was sensitive to the Swedish fears that
establishing bases for allied forces in Norway might lead
to increased Soviet pressure and demands on Finland. 118
In no doubt also had part of its origin in a desire to
placate domestic critics of the proposed pact and to make
the pact more acceptable. 11 ^
This ban on foreign bases was developed not in
response to Western requests but in response to Soviet
protests. In a speech to the Storting in February 1951 the
Minister of Defense, Jens Christian Haugue stated:
"The Norwegian base policy does not prevent Norway from
making bases available to Allied armed forces in the
event of an armed attack in the North Atlantic area, or
from summoning Allied forces to the country at a time
when the Norwegian authorities consider themselves
exposed to the threat of attack. Nor does the Norwegian
base policy prevent Norway, in prescribed constitutional
forms, from entering into conditional agreements with
our Allies having a situation of this kind in mind.
"Our base policy cannot prevent Norway from developing
her military installations in accordance with a
structure which will make them capable of receiving and
effectively maintaining Allied armed forces transferred
in order to assist in the defense of the country.
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"Our base policy cannot prevent Norway from
participating in joint Allied exercises or being visited
for short periods by the naval and air forces of our
Allies, even in peacetime." 120
This policy has been the subject of controversy
since its inception. The Soviets have consistently
regarded the policy as a binding obligation and have
attempted to interpret it in a highly restrictive manner,
despite repeated assertions by the Norwegians that the
policy is not a bilateral agreement, and that they are the
only ones capable of interpreting and applying it.
In 1951, the NATO unified command structure was
established and an agreement was reached to locate NATO's
Northern Command (AF NORTH) at Kolsas, outside Oslo. Along
with this, proposals for the stationing of Allied
(American) fighters in peacetime in Norway and Denmark
began to emerge in light of the growing power imbalance on
the Northern Flank. In a diplomatic note of
15 October 1951 the Soviets asserted Norway was following a
pattern contrary to the assurances previously given. The
Norwegians reaffirmed that their participation in NATO was
a purely defensive measure and directed Soviet attention to
Defense Minister Hauge's speech for a better understanding
191
of their base policy. *
Despite the support of AFNORTH and the endorsement
by the government of the proposal that it accept the
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peacetime stationing of American fighters in Norway, the
Foreign Policy Committee of the Storting rejected it with
only three of the 23 members casting favorable
votes. 129 In January 1953, Foreign Minister Lange
declared the the Norwegian base policy would continue
unchanged. This base policy has constituted one of the
continuing elements of Norwegian security policy and has
acted as a general framework of restraint in which specific
guidelines have been drawn. In 1977, the Government
summarized the established practice since 1951 with the
following:
"Our base policy does not prevent allied forces from
staying in Norway for training purposes for shorter
periods or as a part of allied exercises aimed at
preparing possible allied support to Norway in a
situation where Norwegian authorities request that
allied forces be sent to the country.
"Norwegian base policy does not prevent the
establishment on Norwegian territory of installations
for command, control, communication, navigation,
warning, etc. for allied forces.
"The base policy is no hindrance to the establishment in
Norway of stockpiles of ammunition, equipment, supplies,
etc. for allied forces.
"Norwegian base policy does not prevent Norway's partici-
pation in the integrated military cooperation within the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, agreements on the
transfer, in the prescribed constitutional form, of
command authority over Norwegian forces to allied
command, establishment on Norwegian territory of allied
headquarters and participation in the work of the
latter, or the transfer of Norwegian air forces to
allied operational command in peacetime." 123
Within this framework, Norway laid down rules for
the management of and access to common inf rastruture
92

installations in Norway. All such installations must be
under Norwegian control and be both operated and maintained!
by Norwegian personnel. All depots are stocked in
accordance with specific prestocking agreements and filled
in accordance with NATO's Defense Plans. The installations
themselves belong to Norway, but the supplies within these
installations can only be redistributed, withdrawn or used
elsewhere with the agreement of the Norwegian authorities.
These principles were incorporated in the 19 81 agreement
for the prestocking of the equipment of a Marine Amphibious
Brigade.
This policy is seen in operation in Norway's
participation in NATO's Joint Airborne Control and Warning
Force (NAEW - NATO's Airborne Early Warning or AWACS -
Airborne Warning and Control System) . Norwegian
participation was made contingent upon certain conditions.
In an attachment to the NATO agreement, it was stated that
Norway would have decisive influence on the operational
concept in Norwegian areas of interest, that such
operations would be controlled by Norwegian authorities,
and that the plan of operations in the northern areas must
be compatible with the Norwegian goal of maintaining a low
level of tension in these areas. Orland Air Station was
chosen as a forward operational point and is being prepared
to receive the NAEW aircraft, to perform simple maintenance
tasks and serve as a crew change point in connection with
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routine tasks and exercises. All permanently assigned
personnel at the air station will be Norwegian. On the
average one E-2A aircraft will land and take off from the
field per week.-*- 24
The SOSUS station, the Loran-C and Omega
Navigational Station, and the intelligence listening and
monitoring stations are all manned by Norwegians.
2 . Nuclear Weapons Policy
In 1957, at a NATO summit meeting, a codicial to
Norway's ban on the stationing of foreign troops in Norway
was promulgated. At this time, NATO was considering the
American proposal to establish nuclear stockpiles and
deploy the intermediate range Thor and Jupiter missiles in
Europe.
Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin wrote a letter to
Norwegian Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen warning that the
Norwegian people might "have to pay dearly for the bases
which are built in Norway if the NATO strategist's plans
are carried out." He pointed out that NATO bases in Norway
would constitute "legitimate targets" for Soviet hydrogen
bombs. The veiled threats were reiterated in new letters
on the eve of the December 1957 NATO Heads of Government
meeting. 12^
The governing Labor Party in the spring of 19 57 had
adopted a proposal that "Nuclear weapons must not be
emplaced on Norwegian territories." Thus on 16 December
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1957, even before discussions concerning the emplacement of
nuclear weapons had taken place. Prime Minister Einar
Gerhardsen conducted a preemptive diplomatic strike of his
own. He stated that Norway had no plans to "allow stores
of nuclear weapons to be established on Norwegian territory
or to install launching bases for medium range
missiles." 126 Premier Bulganin wrote shortly
thereafter expressing his "great satisfaction" and it was
in this letter that the formation of a Northern European
nuclear weapons free zone appeared. 27 The Norwegian
Foreign Minister extended the reservation by adding: "Nor
do we have plans to receive stores of nuclear munitions for
tactical nuclear weapons in our country."
In 196 0, the Military Chiefs Committee recommended
that the Norwegian forces be equipped with tactical nuclear
weapons for the direct defense of Norwegian territory. The
emplacement was considered necessary so as to create a
situation in which an adversary would be subject to the
same tactical constraints the Norwegians faced and because
the rapid concentration and dispersal of troops
necessitated nuclear weapons be in place in peacetime.
The government in an evaluation of policy decided
that nuclear munitions for battlefield weapons would not be
stored on Norwegian territory in peacetime, stressing the




to assess the adequacy of these defense measure. ^ In
1961, this policy was formulated in rather stark terms:
"Nuclear weapons will not be stationed on Norwegian
territory. n
Norwegian policy prohibits the storage and
deployment of nuclear weapons. Norwegian forces do not
receive training in the use of nuclear weapons, nor does
Norway have any special munition sites for the storage of
such weapons. Norway has no delivery systems that are
certified for nuclear use and the special communications
systems utilized in connection with nuclear weapons have
not been installed. Norway has not concluded a Program of
Cooperation (POC) Agreement with the United States. This
agreement is required by Section 144b of the U.S. Atomic
Energy Act in order to transfer information about nuclear
operations in peacetime or the actual transfer of weapons
in wartime. Within NATO only Norway, Denmark, and
Luxembourg have no such agreement and in the absence of
such an agreement a request for transfer or nuclear weapons
must rest before the joint committee of the U.S. Congress
for sixty days. Norway has deliberately refrained from
undertaking any measures or concluding agreements which
would facilitate a change in policy in response to attacks
or threats of attacks.
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Norway is willing to accept the security provided
by the American "nuclear umbrella" but desires to avoid the
risk associated with possession of nuclear weapons. This
ambiguity is expressed in the official statement that:
"The formulation of the Norwegian nuclear weapons
policy does not prevent the Norwegian defense in the
event of war from being supported by external forces
which may have at their disposal nuclear weapons for
tactical use by their own units. As distinguished from
conventional reinforcements, no preparations have been
made in peacetime, however, for receiving possible
allied nuclear weapons during crisis or war. Both the
insertion of such reinforcements and the use of their
nuclear weapons require Norwegian consent. "i 2 ^
In an interview with the Norwegian newspaper
Af tenposten on 29 October 19 82, Foreign Minister Svenn
Stray stated that "Norway decides on her own if our country
shall request assistance and maintains complete control
over which weapons will be used. We have no reason to
doubt that the Americans will abide by the agreement."
The interpretation of this policy has led to some
confusion. In 1975, in a thesis in political science by
Mayor Anders Hellebust it was claimed that United States
SSBN's were utilizing the Omega and Loran Navigational
Systems.
^
The controversy arose over whether
Norwegian consent had been granted in light of the systems 1
alleged support of SSBN operations. An official
investigation found no wrongdoing and the government has
stressed the systems are general navigation systems with
civilian purposes also. These systems could be of use to
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maritime reinforcements and American SSBN's are not
dependent on them. These systems are operated by Norwegian
personnel and are not considered violations of Norway's
policy on foreign bases or nuclear weapons. The ban on
nuclear weapons has been interpreted to preclude the visit
of SSBN's to Norwegian harbors and in 19 80 an exercise
involving F-lll bombers which can carry either conventional
ordnance or atomic weapons was cancelled due to the
complaints of critics that Norway might be compromising her
policy on nuclear weapons.
Norway's nuclear fears also found their way into
the 19 81 Memorandum of Understanding concerning the
prestocking of supplies and equipment for a United States
Marine Amphibious Brigade. This memorandum contained the
following clause:
"Norwegian policies with respect to the stationing of
foreign troops on Norwegian territory and the
stockpiling or deployment of nuclear weapons on
No]
ag:
irwegian territory will not be altered by this
ireement. n132
Norway has signed both the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. By its adherence to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty Norway is bound not to accept,
directly or indirectly, or to gain control of nuclear
v/arheads. Norway is also forbidden to produce or in any
other way obtain or accept assistance in the production of
nuclear weapons. Despite these restrictions Norway is a
member of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group and participates in
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the planning and formulation of the principles for the
Allies 1 possible use of- nuclear weapons, but without being
a party to the actual control cf the weapons.
Chemical weapons were added to the list of
proscribed weapons in 1980.
3 . Military Activities
Norway has imposed a series of constraints on
routine military activities in order to emphasize their
defense intentions and to reduce friction in sensitive
areas. In this regard exercises normally follow a regular
pattern and the Norwegians do not allow Allied land force
exercises in the northeastern county of Finnmark. No
allied aircraft are allowed east of the 24° East
Meridian and Allied naval vessels are generally restricted
from Norwegian territorial waters East of this same
Meridian (the Soviet-Norwegian border is located in
Finnmark roughly between 29° and 31° East) .
Exercises in Norway are of limited duration.
Norway goes beyond the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) , which required
announcement of all exercises involving more than 25,000
men twenty-one days before they start. Norway announces
all exercises involving 10,000 men or more thirty days
before they begin and invites observers to attend all
exercises involving Allied participation. Concern over
Soviet sensitivities is also evident in the size of
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Norwegian forces on the Soviet border. The Norwegian
forces in the north cannot be considered a threat to the
Soviets. These sensitivities also contributed to the
decision to preposition the equipment and suDplies of the
United States Marine Amphibious Brigade in Trondelag rather
than in the north where deployment of the U.S. Marines
might be viewed as an unnecessary provocation. This is
also seen in the division of labor of maritime patrol
aircraft in the north. Norwegian maritime patrol aircraft
patrol the Barents Sea, thus enabling NATO to avoid
American patrols in an area of extreme Soviet
sensitivity.^3
It is the concern of the Norwegians to ensure the
proper mix of deterrence and reassurance so as to best
guarantee Norway's independence and freedom of action with
regard to the Soviet Union.
E. IMPROVEMENTS
Norway is actively engaged in improving the quality of
its deterrent forces. The Air Force is in the process of
converting over to a force composed entirely of F-16
aircraft. In addition, the government has undertaken to
acquire a new air-to-surface missile, the PENGUIN Mark 3.
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Despite the appearance of Northern Europe "as one of
the quietest and most secure corners of the world, "134
it is calm only in comparison to such areas as the Southern
Flank of NATO where the confrontations between Greece and
Turkey have received considerable press coverage and world
attention. Despite this quiet facade, the Russians and
Norway have been engaged in a series of diplomatic
conflicts from as far back as the 1860's over a variety of
issues. 135 These issues have represented an
"intersection between economic interests, security
policies, jurisdiction, the protection of resources and the
environment" 136 and considered vital by each nation.
The Soviet aims in the North are a reflection of both
regional and global objectives. The area offers the Soviet
Union a chance to expand its sphere of influence without
risking a direct military confrontation with the West.
Such activities would tend to improve its global military
strategic position. As a by-product of its strategic and
conventional military forces on the Kola Peninsula, the
Soviets are ensured a role as the dominant power in
Northern Europe. Their short term goal in the area is
system preservation. Within this context the present
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status quo is acceptable, and NATO efforts to rectify the
correlation of forces in the north are viewed with grave
concern. An ideal solution from the Soviet viewpoint would
be for Norway to withdraw from NATO and accept a relation-
ship similar to the one the Soviets have with Finland.
Russia expects to be treated as a superpower with global
interests and in the Soviet-Norwegian relationship* this
implies that in Soviet eyes Norway must adiust to the
Soviet superpower position since the specific Soviet
interests in the northern area are so pronounced and vital.
The Soviets try to ensure that Norway's defense posture
does not threaten the Murmansk naval complex or Soviet
•access to the North Atlantic.
In attempting to influence Norwegian policy the Soviets
have been unable to utilize one of their favor ate
instruments - the domestic communist party. The Norges
Kommunistiske Parti (Norwegian Communist Party) (NKP) , due
to its role in the resistance during the Second World War,
managed to capture 11.9 per cent of the vote and 11 of the
Stortings 150 seats. ^7 With the Soviet part in the
1948 coud in Czechlosovakia, the 1948 Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with Finland and a
perception of the growing Soviet threat in the north, the
NKP share of the votes fell to 5.8 per cent and no seats in
the Storting. It is the actions of the Soviets themselves
rather than the activities of the NKP that have resulted in
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its low standing in Norwegian politics with a mere 0.4 per
cent of the vote. Its historical pattern of membership in
the Norwegian Storting is shown in Table II I. -^ £
In the 1950s and 196 0s, Soviet concern over Norwegian
participation in NATO came to the fore. Fears concerning
Norway's policy regarding the stationing of troops or
nuclear weapons dominated the scene. The Soviet method was
to attempt to intimidate the Norwegians and utilize the
threat of force as exemplified by Soviet nuclear might in
the 1950s. In the 1960s, as Soviet military might
increased, the Soviets still attempted to influence
Norwegians in a heavy handed manner and had shifted to
demonstrations of this might in the form of exercises. The
pattern of Soviet exercises in shown in Figure 9. Though
in recent years the exercises on the Kola Peninsula have
not included maneuvers with airborne troops or marine
infantry units. It was these elements in the Soviet
pattern of exercises which had caused the greatest
concern. ^ Possible invation plans are shown in
Figure 10.
The Soviets have not restricted their attempts to
influence Norway merely to force and the threat of its use.
They have pursued their long range objective of wooing
Norway from NATO patiently and persistently while applying
alternate waves of threat, cajolery, and blandishment.
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Figure 9. Pattern of Soviet Exercises
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Figure 10. Possible Invasion Plans
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efforts to stimulate domestic pressure on governments.
They have attempted to use the unilateral concessions of
their neighbors as a means tc extort still mere concessions
of their neighbors as a means to extort still more
concessions from them. I'**' An example may be seen in
the Gray Zone Agreement, which will be discussed in a
subsequent section.
In the 1970s, the disputes between Norway and the
Soviet Union revolved around competing interests with
respect to the pattern of jurisdiction and resource
management. The discovery of oil and gas under the
continental shelf in the Norwegian Sea has only served to
reinforce each side's desire for a solution in its favor.
The overall objective of Norwegian foreign policy is to
develop a framework for a stable order in the high North
based on as low a level of tension and military competition
as possible. This order is based on a balance of power and
an interplay of forces. The Norwegians have attempted to
place their relations with the Soviets on a business as
usual basis and actively sought to encourage a policy of
detente. Detente holds out the hope of improving relations
between the two countries, lessening tension and resolving
competing jurisdictional claims in the North. Norway's
search for a viable "Nordpolitikk" is seen as an attempt to
resolve the bilateral issues between the two countries. If
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it is to avoid compromising Norwegian security, it must
proceed with the full understanding and support of Norway's
allies.
To promote Norway's policy of Nordpolitikk the
government has encouraged the development of trade and
cultural exchanges. A direct trade route between Norway
and the Soviet Union was recently inaugurated at Starskog
in South Varanger and an expansion of the harbor at
Kirkenes is being contemplated.^^ Norway has also
signed an agreement to help the Soviet state company,
Sudimport, prepare a master plan for oil exploration in the
Barents Sea. Commercial deliveries to the project are
subject to rules established by the West for trade with
Eastern Bloc countries.
Norway is subject to high technology espionage just as
other NATO members are. A Norv/egian firm was recently
approached by three foreigners who wished to purchase four
submersibles capable of operating at water depths of 3,000
meters. Forty million Norwegian krone cash was offered for
the submarines, but the deal collapsed when the prospective
clients were informed that papers had to be signed
prohibiting the re-export of the submarines to East Bloc
countries. Subsequent investigation revealed the clients
represented a company specializing in trade with the Soviet
142Union and other East Bloc countries. *
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B. SOVIET MIGHT DISPLAYED
While force has not been used to effect the course of
Soviet-Norwegian relations, the display of force has been
used for psychological effect. Occasional remainders of
overwhelming military power and ability to strike at will
are provided by sporadic overflights, occasional submarine
penetration of Norwegian fjords and Soviet exercises. The
Norwegians carry out approximately 150 interceptions of
Soviet military aircraft, mostly bombers, over
international waters per year.^^ There have been ten
serious violations of Norwegian air space resulting in
formal protests since 1970. Of the 226 registered reports
of unidentified obiects in Norwegian territorial waters
over the last 14 years, 122 are classified as certain,
probable or possible submarines by Norwegian military
authorities. Such incidents may serve the double
purpose of stressing the inadequacy of the national defense
system while testing the government's political will to
react determinedly and forcefully.
Soviet surface units have deployed in the North
Atlantic primarily to participate in exercises rather than
for patrols. In the early post war years Soviet naval
maneuvers were carried out primarily in the fleet areas of
the Barents and Baltic Sea. These still constitute the
main training area and are utilized on a year round basis.
The exercises of the early 1950s indicated a belief that
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the primary confrontation between Soviet and Western naval
forces would take place north and east of the Lafoten
Islands in northern Norway. From IT 56 on the operational
areas were extended westward. In 196 3 the pattern changed.
and a pattern of two major exercises, one in spring and one
in autumn, has emerged. With this pattern came a change
came an increase in the area of operations. This area now
extends to the whole of the Norwegian Sea and occasionally
into the central parts of the Atlantic. These exercises
have shown the movement of the Soviet forward defense zone
to the G-I-UK Gap covering the access routes to and from
the Atlantic.
The Soviets conducted three major exercises in recent
years that break with the annual pattern. These were SEVER
in July 1968, OKEAN in April 1970 and VESNA in April 1975.
These three exercises involved extensive deployment of
naval forces. SEVER was geographically limited to the
Barents, Norwegian and North Seas, the Northeast Atlantic
and the Baltic whereas OKEAN and VESNA were worldwide
centrally controlled operations. All three exercises in
the light of Soviet publicity appear to have been
undertaken primarily as demonstrations of Soviet naval
might. 145
These exercises involved the deployment of forces into
the Atlantic. The initial phase of actual exercise ploy
appears to have taken place in the Norwegian Sea and to
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have been antisubmarine warfare-oriented. The second phase
involved coordinated sub-surface, surface, and air strikes
against an aggressor force moving to the northeast Atlantic
through the G-I-UK Gap. In addition, in exercise VESNA the
Soviets seemed to exercise attacks against simulated
Western reinforcements and convoys bound for Europe from
North America. In support of these operations BACKFIRE
bombers were flown from airfields on the Kola Peninsula.
The bombers were temporarily transferred to the Northern
Fleet and upon completion returned to their home
bases. 146
In addition, the last phases of the SEVER exercise of
1968 and the OKEAN exercise of 1970 involved Soviet task
forces launched from the Baltic which hugged the Norwegian
coast in a move North. These task forces conducted
amphibious landings on the Pechenga Peninsula. The
similarity of this pattern to the German landings of 1940
was unmistakeable and left the clear message it could
happen again. These amphibious forces were retained in the
north and seen as a substantial increase in Soviet
offensive capabilities in the north. These capabilities
were practiced during the KORPATHY exercises held in the
summer of 1977.
Soviet naval exercises have become an instrument of
political influence and a feature of the peacetime
political environment. By exercising their forces in a
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frequent and visible manner they have managed to create the
impression that the Soviet Union has a dominant position in
the North Sea/North Atlantic area and that its legitimate
defensive perimeter is now the G-I-UK Gap. 147 With
this extension the guarantee of seaborne reinforcements to
Europe is placed in question and the perception is created
that Norway has already fallen behind the Soviet Union's
forward defense perimeter.
C. SOVIET-NORWEGIAN INTERACTION
The first years after the war saw the failure of
Norway's policy of bridgebuilding , Norway's rejection of
neutrality and of a Scandinavian defense pact in favor of
NATO membership. Once Norwegian membership in NATO had
been realized in April 1949, Norway set out defining the
full extent of her role within NATO.
Norway's prohibitions on nuclear weapons and foreign
troops came about partly from domestic politics and as a
response to Soviet recriminations. In 1959, a controversy
arose over the creation of NATO's Ealtic Approaches Command
and the assignment of West German officers to the NATO
staff at Kolsas. The German Navy was assigned a major role
in the defense of the Baltic approaches, including portions
of Southern Norway. This defense entailed the stockpiling
of fuel and ammunition for use by the West German Navy.
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The Soviets protested this stockpiling, contending that
the establishment cf supply depots for the West German Navy
could be viewed as nothing other than the establishment of
military bases for foreign troops. The Soviets asserted
that Norway was reneging on assurances given earlier and
permitting foreign bases. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko issued thinly veiled warnings of the possible
consequences of Norway's actions. Despite Soviet
objections, the Storting in December 1959 approved the
prepositioning of suDplies for the West German Navy.
On 1 May 196 the Soviet Union shot down a U-2
reconnaissance aircraft over the Urals. The subsequent
investigation and the testimony of Francis Gary Powers
revealed the U-2 plane was to land on the Bodo .Military
Airfield on completion of its flight. 148 This led to
Premier Khrushchev, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense
Minister Malinovskiy issuing warnings threatening to
destroy bases which other countries made available for
aircraft that violated Soviet airspace. The Soviets
accused the Norwegians of participating in American
espionage. The Norwegians responded that they had no
knowledge of American flights over Soviet territory and had
never given permission for flights which violated the
airspace of other countries. The Norwegians delivered a
protest to the American ambassador, but the Soviets were
not placated by the fact that Norv/ay had protested to the
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United States and had demanded and received American
assurances of non-repetition. The Soviets continued to
warn of dire consequences if the event should be repeated.
Shortly thereafter, on 1 July I960, the Soviet Union
shot down another American reconnaissance plane. This time
the plane was an RB-47 shot down in the Barents Sea off the
Kola Peninsula. The Russians alleged that the plane had
violated their territory and that it had been told to land
in Norway in case of emergency. The Soviets protested that
"Norway was still being used by the U.S.A. for carrying out
aggressive actions against the Soviet Union." 149
Norway rejected the protest and a subsequent Soviet note
asserted the Norwegians had either acquiesced in assisting
the RB-47 or that the Americans thought it unnecessary to
request permission before landing.
Relations remained cool and it was at this point that
the Soviets attempted to sway the Norwegians with the lure
of a proposal that the Soviets submitted to the 16th United
Nations General Assembly. This proposal called for the
establishment of nuclear weapon free zones but failed to
gain much support. 1^0
In a speech to the Storting in October I960, Foreign
Minister Halvard Lange stated that "everyone" should under-
stand that Norway desired to maintain good relations with
the Soviet Union and all nations who wished to maintain
good relations with Norway should "respect this as
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fundamental Norwegian foreign policy" and that "seeking
security through NATO membership was also fundamental
Norwegian policy. "151 Lange made it clear that,
although Norwegian public opinion was disturbed by what had
happened, the government did not feel itself to be under
threat of attack from the Soviets (a clear reference to the
possibility of invoking NATO aid) . He did state that if
the Soviet Union continued her threatening attitude- the
government might be forced to reconsider its policy. ^ 2
These crises were followed by the Finno-Soviet crisis
of October-November 1961. In a note to Finland on
30 October, the Soviet Union proposed consultation under
the 1948 Friendship Treaty in order to "secure the defense
of both countries against the threat of a military attack
from Western Germany and her Allies." The note argued that
the Bonn "revanchists" were penetrating Northern Europe
militarily and about to achieve the aims pursued by Hitler
in World War II. 153
The two main interpretations of the note are: (1) as
an expression of genuine concern over a resurgent West
Germany; and (2) as an attempt to influence the upcoming
Finnish presidential election in 1962. The initiative for
the note had apparently come from Soviet military leaders
(not its political leaders), thus reflecting a possible
expansion in the influence of the military since the
shooting down of the U-2 plane.
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Norway was severely criticized in the note. Norway's
response was calm and based on the assumption that Norway
could most effectively assist her Scandinavian neighbor
Finland by handling the accusations against Norway. The
first response was to state on 31 October 1961 that Norway
had no business answering the note for Finland but, since
Norway had been attacked in the note, the defense nature of
the Norwegian defense establishment was emphasized.
Norway was faced with the option of either accepting
the Soviet interpretation and giving up cooperation with
the Federal Republic of Germany or of challenging the
Soviet interpretation of the facts. The Norwegians chose
the latter and rejected any Soviet right to redress the
balance by moves in Finland. Norway defended her right to
continue NATn membership in a manner best serving Norway's
security interests as interpreted by the Norwegians
themselves
.
The note was viewed as an attempt to limit and
circumscribe Norwegian participation in NATO. Norwegian
initial responses were limited to defending the status quo
rather than warning the Soviet Union of the possible
consequences of continued pressure on Finland.
On 16 November 1961, the First Vice Premier of the
Soviet Union, Kusnetsov called on the Finnish ambassador to
insist on the proposed staff talks and asserted that events
in Northern Europe had proved that the original analysis
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was correct. These events were: (1) the visit of German
Defense Minister Strauss to Norway; (2) NATO maneuvers in
the Western part of the Baltic; and (3) the negotiations
concerning the proposed NATO Baltic Approaches Command. He
further asserted that the 13 November 1961 decision by the
Finnish cabinet to move forward the Finnish presidential
election was not a sufficient response.
President Kekkonen of Finland asserted that Finland was
not asking for outside help in dealing with its Eastern
neighbor, and that Finland was not accepting any added
burden created by the policies of other countries. In
response to the continuing pressure on Finland, Norwegian
leaders added to their previous arguments and explanations
warnings about the possible consequences on Norwegian
security policy if pressure on Finland continued.
Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange told Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko and First Vice Premier Mikoyan that Norway
had made it a primary objective of her policy to contribute
to the peace and stability of the North and expressed the
hope that the balance that had been established in the
North would be preserved. Gromyko expressed his agreement
with the Norwegian Foreign Minister.
Simultaneously with these concerns. Defense
Minister Gudmund Harlem at a speech in Copenhagen on
21 November 1961 argued that NATO had given Norway
security, and efforts to press Norway to leave NATO would
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not succeed. He stated that Molotov and Stalin had scared
Norway into NATO, and without their help Norway might never
have joined. He asserted that, contrary to threats driving
Norway out of NATO, they would drive Norway more firmly
into NATO. 154
The Defense Minister expressed his understanding of
Soviet concerns but stated that he sometimes felt that the
Soviets were uneasy without reason. He trusted Soviet
realism to prevail and reminded the Soviets of the
Norwegian attitude towards the stationing of nuclear
weapons on Norwegian territory. The Defense Minister did
not go into the nuclear question in any great length but by
mentioning the issue and linking it to the hope of
continued Soviet realism he gave a clear warning that
Norway's nuclear policy was not immutable.
These remarks served to strengthen President Kekkonen's
position in his meeting with Premier Khrushchev on
24 November at Novosibirsk. In the face of Khrushchev's
reiteration of Soviet concerns, President Kekkonen warned
that Finnish-Soviet consultations might "arouse a certain
uneasiness and lead to a war psychosis in the Scandinavian
countries" and that putting an end to Soviet insistence on
military consultations "would help to decrease the
necessity of war preparations not only in Finland and in





Khrushchev accepted Kekkonen's judgement and dropped
the demand for joint staff talks. Kekkonen for his part
promised more Soviet-Finnish trade and to report more
actively his assessment of military developments in the
Baltic Sea area (the watch dog role) . The true signifi-
cance of the note crisis is that it appeared not to be an
alteration but rather a confirmation of the status quo in
the Nordic countries. It is this status quo which has come
to be called the Nordic balance and will be discussed in
Chapter VI.
During the 196 0s a pattern of NATO biennial exercises
developed. The Soviets routinely protested these exercises
as aggressive, provocative, and as violations of Norway's
base policy. It was during these years that debate on
Norwegian membership in NATO grew. During the debate in
the Storting on 13-14 June 1968 a motion that Norway
withdraw from NATO was supported by only six of the
Storting's 150 members. 155 The years 1962 through 1965
saw a series of proposals put forth by Finnish President
Kekkonen concerning nuclear weapons. Some experts have
postulated that Finland in this regard served as a tool of
the Soviet Union in the hope of making the proposals more
acceptable. 15^
On 7 June 1968, large Soviet troop movements were
reported during the night. Sunrise the next day revealed
large units (as many as 50,000 men) with tanks and
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artillery were positioned just 2 km from the Norwegian
border with cannons aimed at the Norwegian observation post
and the nearest Norwegian bridge. Additional troops were
flown in for several days including part of a paratroop
battalion. The 450 Norwegian soldiers went unreinfcrced
while the Soviets conducted military maneuvers and chances
of position with their tanks, artillery and air cover for
five days.
As news of this demonstration spread, the government
asked the news media not to play up the story and in effect
to "kill it". The press complied and on 12 June 1968 the
troops were withdrawn with no explanations offered by
Soviet or Norwegian authorities. 156 When questioned
some weeks later as to the why of the maneuvers, Soviet
Premier Kosygin at a press conference in Stockholm answered
that it was "a maneuver intended as an answer."-15 ' It
has been speculated the exercise was a response to the
large NATO exercises Polar Bear and Polar Express held in
the spring of 1968 or as a possible warning to the West
against reacting to a move elsewhere, such as that in
Czechlosovakia a few weeks later. Possibly the only real
effect was to make it even less likely that Norway would
exercise its option to withdraw from NATO in 1969. It was
extremely ill-timed as a vote on Norwegian withdrawal from
NATO was held one day after the Soviet troops withdrew.
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In the early and mid-1970s Norway undertook to
gradually extend the normalization of relations with the
Federal Republic of Germany to the area of military
cooperation within the framework of NATO. Initially, West
German participation consisted of about 180 German medics
in NATO's 1S76 exercise "ATLAS EXPRESS." This policy met
criticism on both the domestic and international fronts.
Memories of the German scorched earth policy of 1945 were
still strong on the domestic front and on the international
level both the Soviet Union and Finland complained
regarding German participation.
Early in 1977, the Norwegian government announced that
the West German communication group and small helicopter
unit earmarked for NATO's Allied Mobile Force (AMF) and
thus possible deployment to Norway in time of crisis were
scheduled to participate in the 1978 AMF exercise "Arctic
Express." It was anticipated that the AMF ' s German
infantry unit would eventually be included in the AMF
exercise. However, "normalization" was halted in
January 1978 when it was announced that German participa-
tion had reached an "appropriate level" - i.e., without
infantry participation. The halt of "normalization" was
announced in January 1978 and the government denied that
the decision to stop at the present level of participation
represented a retreat in the face of criticism. The
validity of this is subject to debate, as Finnish President
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Urko Kekkonen in a fail visit to Oslo stated that "it is
not a matter of indifference to Finland who Norway will
cooperate with militarily" and in December 1977 Prime
Minister Odvar Nordli had been subject to an extremely
critical attack concerning Norway's growing military
cooperation with the Federal Republic by Kosygin at an
informal meeting of Nordic Prime Ministers in
Helsinki. 160
The latter half of the 1970s saw the resurgence of
Soviet attacks upon Norway's policies within NATO. As
Norway opened discussions in 1977 with the United States,
Canada and the United Kingdom concerning the stockpiling of
equipment and supplies for reinforcements that might arrive
by air, the Soviets alleged Norway was going back on its
reassurance concerning the stationing of foreign troops on
Norv/egian soil. Norway denied this and assured the Soviets
it had not altered its stated policy.
A series of "mini crises"-1- 61 dominated Soviet-
Norwegian relations in 1978. The first of these came in
Svalbard (which will be discussed in a subsequent section),
where two Soviet helicopters violated Norwegian administra-
tive rules on procedure and clearance. It was one of a
long series of incidents attempting to show that in regards
to Soviet actions on Svalbard Norway was unable to do
anything but register a complaint.
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The next crisis concerned the "boat episodes," when
between 27 June and 24 July 197 8, there were eleven
reported violations where Soviet vessels made illegal stops
and anchored off the coast of Finmark. These were a clear
violation of international law which allows vessels the
right of innocent passage through national waters but only
authorizes stopping under unusual and critical circum-
stances. A variety of excuses including engine trouble,
crew injury and dangerous weather conditions were offered
but upon investigation most of the rationales did not hold
up. After a large uproar in the media it was met with a
Soviet explanation which stated the ships were engaged in
innocent passage, and only four of the eleven represented
border violations. Soviet regrets were expressed in the
case of only one episode. The Defense Chief Sverre Amre
had classified these intrusions as "gunboat diplomacy" but
upon receipt of the Soviet explanation the Foreign Minister
proclaimed himself satisfied and warned the media against
any further over-dramatization of these episodes. Prior to
this crisis only seven such incidents had been reported in
the 33 years since the war.
The prior seven violations had been scattered over the
entire Norwegian coastline but all eleven of these new
violations occurred in the Barents Sea off the Varanger and
Nordkyn Peninsulas. In Gamvik, Nordkyn. the Norwegian
government operates a kay listening post which serves as
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the terminus of the submarine monitoring cable linking
sonar stations lying on the seabed between Norway and
Spitzbergen.
Following this four Norwegian journalists scheduled to
cover negotiations about the controversial Grey Zone
Agreement (to be discussed later) had their visas rescinded
with no explanation. Svalbard again came to the force when
it was revealed on 30 August 1978 that the Soviets were in
the process of erecting a large new radar station and
erecting a new airstrip (which has since been completed).
The most dramatic crisis was that involving the crash
of a Soviet Tupolev TU-16 Badger type aircraft (a light
bomber) on the Norwegian island of Hopen. In the crash all
seven crew members were killed. A possibility existed that
the flight was an illegal intrusion of Norwegian airspace
rather than a forced landing. Not wishing to provoke the
Soviets a civilian rather than a military investigation was
undertaken. Soviet authorities were invited to
participate.
At the site of the crash frequent and angry protests
were made by the Russians. Three Soviet fishing vessels
anchored in the sea off Hopen, and a Kresta cruiser soon
arrived on the scene. A decision was made to allow Soviet
personnel ashore to pick up the wreckage but prior to their
arrival ashore the Norwegians found the "black box" flight
recorder which could reveal the flight patterns and routes
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of the plane for at least thirty hours before its crash.
Upon arrival on the island the Russians sealed the recorder
but the chairman of the Norwegian investigation commission
asserted the recorder was vital to the investigation and
refused to surrender it.
Plans were made to open the box and the Soviets were
invited to participate, but refused; a protest over
Norway's "unfriendly action" was delivered. Deputy Defense
Minister Hoist's planned visit to the Soviet Union was
cancelled as were the newly scheduled talks on the Grey
Zone Agreement and the deliberations of the Norwegian-
Soviet Fisheries Commission.
Another mini-crisis appeared in the form of violations
of the Grey Zone Agreement. The Soviets had on three
recent occasions stopped and insDected British trawlers
fishing in the zone with Norwegian licenses.
The box was opened on 6 October 1978 and after much
delay it was leaked that "rust" had destroyed the instru-
ment and only one hour of flight information was available
from it. The Norwegian government never released any
information concerning the results of the examination of
the box and it was returned to the Soviets on 15 November.
This line of cooperation with the Soviets produced a thaw




Soviet-Norwegian conflict in the 19 80s has come to
center around Norway's efforts to enhance her defense readi-
ness within NATO through the prestocking of equipment and
supplies for potential reinforcers and in a series of juris-
dictional disputes. Despite vociferous protests by the
Soviets, who claimed that the 19 81 U.S. Marine Amphibious
Brigade prestocking agreement was a violation of Norway's
ban on the stationing of foreign troops, the Norwegian
government signed the agreement on 16 January 1981.
Originally the plan had been to locate the storage site
in the North, but as a compromise to domestic critics of
the government and in deference to Soviet sensitivities, it
was decided that the storage site would be located in
central Norway. The reasons were several:
(1) it avoided the possible esclatory pressure caused
by the introduction of U.S. troops to an area of
high Soviet sensitivity;
(2) increased the options for further deployment of
these forces;
(3) the equipment being further from the scene of a




(4) it allayed U.S. concerns over air lifting forces
into an area where the Soviets had a significant
advantage in forces and the air threat v/as
extremely high.-'- 62
The Soviets asserted in a February 1982 TASS commen-
tary that among the items to be stockpiled would be "artil-
l ft
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lery systems adapted for using nuclear shells."
Since this issue was so sensitive, Defense Minister Anders
Sjaastad issued an immediate denial in an interview to the
Aftenposten on 9 February 19 82, where he acknowledged
that, in theory, nuclear shells could be used in the 155
millimeter howitzers which wer? to be stockpiled, but he
reiterated earlier guarantees that there were no plans to
store in Norway the equipment which would be necessary to
give them that capability. 164
The jurisdictional disputes have centered around three
issues: (1) Svalbard; (2) Barents Sea continental shelf;
and (3) Grey Zones of the Barents Sea.
1 . Svalbard
Svalbard is the large archipelago located
between Latitude 74° and 81° North and Longitude
10° and 35° East. It consists of numerous islands
of which the largest is Spitzbergen. The islands were
discovered by Vikings in the early 13th century and were
the subject of numerous competing claims. The Norwegians,
Russians, Swedes, Germans, Danes, Dutch and the English, at
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one time or another, all claimed sovereignty.^ 5
However, under international law the territory remained
terra nullius, as no one country cculd convince the others
to renounce their claims.
In Oslo in 1914 an international conference was
held to resolve the "Spitzbergen" problem and a draft
convention for a joint rule over Svalbard by Norway, Russia
and Sweden was proposed. 1^6 with the onset of World
War I, agreement was never reached and the problem of
Svalbard was raised at the Versailles Peace Conference. On
9 February 1920 the Treaty of Svalbard was signed.
The signing of the treaty did not resolve all
claims as the treaty awarded sovereignty over Svalbard to
Norway in Article il67 but the Soviet Union and Germany
were not represented at the conference and thus questioned
the validity of the treaty. The rights of all countries to
the resources of the island v/ere guaranteed in Article II
and the rights of Soviet nationals were specifically
guaranteed under Article X. This guarantee to the Soviets
was required as their government was not recognized as the
de jure government of the Soviet Union. Norway's de jure
recognition of the Soviet government was a prerequisite to
Soviet accession to the treaty. Soviet recognition of
Norwegian sovereignty was confirmed in a declaration on
15 February 1924, but it was not until 7 May 1935 that the
Soviet deposited their declaration of accession with the
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French Foreign Ministry. Despite this. Norway had assumed
full sovereignty over the island on 14 August 1925. 10ij
This Treaty "provided all signatories with equal
rights to economic activity on the islands and their circum-
adjacent territorial waters without discrimination. "169
The treaty listed those branches of economic activity to
which the right of equal status applied. These were:
"maritime operations such as fishing, whaling, and sealings
and industrial, mining and commercial operations." 170
The Norwegians had been awarded sovereignty over the
islands but Article IX of the treaty restricted this right,
stipulating that the islands never be used for warlike
purposes, and forbade the establishment of permanent naval
bases or military fortifications. The treaty also estab-
lished the territorial waters of the islands as four miles.
Coal is the major resource on the island and only
the Russians and Norwegians maintain a permanent presence
there. 171 Average production of coal is about 450,000
tons each for the Russians and Norwegians. The prospects
for oil on the island are not high, but periodic efforts
are made to locate it. 17 ^ Since "the Barents Sea
continental shelf extends just beyond Svalbard there is
reason to believe that significant oil and gas reserves may
be located around the island." 173 The Canadians have
reported discovering uranium beneath the islands frozen
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tundra, but the economic feasibility of mining it has yet
to be determined.
Svalbard's importance is not to be measured only in
economic terms since "for the Soviet Union the local eco-
nomic activity must represent a considerable loss." 17 -
Svalbard's importance stems mainly from its strategic
location at the Northern end of the Barents-Norwegian
gateway, its position under possible missile flight paths,
its use for a possible defense against U.S. air launched
cruise missiles, and to extend Soviet reach into the
Atlantic against NATO's sea lanes of communication.
l
7 ^
This potential for use in war may well reinforce the
determination of both the Soviet Union and Norway (NATO)
that the status quo on Svalbard not be disturbed and that
the islands remain demilitarized. The seabed around the
area might be utilized for weapons emplacement; however,
Norway, the United States and the Soviet Union are all
signatories to the 1971 treaty on the prohibition of the
emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the
subsoil thereof. 17 °
The Soviets have never liked the Svalbard Treaty of
1920; but "having reluctantly accepted in they are deter-
mined to take full advantage of the small print," 1 ' 7
and conflict has arisen from different interpretations of
the terms of the treaty and a desire on the part of the
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Soviets for a change in the regime of the island. The
Soviets would like to see a "condominium" arrangement
whereby joint sovereignty is established over the island.
This partly explains the Soviet drive from Foreign Minister
V. Molotov's demand in 1944 for a treaty revision to the
current disregard of Norwegian rules and regulations.
Provocations such as the unauthorized building of a
helicopter port and numerous other violations occur on a
repetitive basis. 178
The Soviet Union has tried to systematically
persuade Norway to accept the principle of prior Norwegian-
Soviet consultations concerning any law or measure
affecting Svalbard; and in 1974, the Soviets sought a joint
declaration of principles and a general cooperative agree-
ment calling for regular political consultations and the
establishment of a number of concrete cooperation projects.
"Norway has turned down all Soviet attempts to emphasize
the importance of the two countries cooperation on Svalbard
as being in conflict with the Spitzbergen treaty in that it
would favor the Soviet Union at the expense of the other
signatory powers." 17 ^
The issue of sovereignty over the archipelago is
further complicated by the dispute concerning a continental
shelf in the area. The Norwegians in 1970 declared that
the Norwegian continental shelf in the Barents Sea extended
out to and beyond Svalbard. This in effect dismissed any
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assertions that Svalbard might have a continental shelf
beyond its territorial waters of four miles. The Soviets
have asserted the existence of a Svalbard continent?! shelf
of unspecified size- and maintained that the international-
ization and equality elements of the treaty would apply.
The Norwegians countered that the Svalbard treaty only
established a non-discriminatory resource regime on the
islands and within the four mile territorial v/aters of the
archipelago and thus any shelf outside the four miles
would, by the terms of the treaty, itself fall under
Norwegian sovereignty.
Norway's allies have not endorsed Norway's
position, as it would eliminate them from any potential
riches under the contested continental shelf180 and
have thus reserved judgement on this issue to a later
date. 181 The situation is further complicated by
Article VIII of the Treaty which limits the export tax on
minerals to one per cent and stipulates that taxes or
duties collected should be devoted to the territories of
the archipelago and are not to exceed expenses; thus no tax
surplus is possible. This situation compares very
favorably to the taxes in the North Sea which run between
60 to 70 per cent. 182
It is of interest that Soviet security interests
might best be served by an exclusively Norwegian
development of the contested shelf rather than an
139

unrestrained development of the shelf by the signatories
(49 to date) of the 1920 Treaty of Svalbard. As for a
condominium or sharing of sovereignty and responsibility
for the islands, it could not be implemented without an
amendment to the Norwegian Constitution, as the act of the
Storting that implemented the treaty made Svalbard a part
of Norway itself and a change to the basic treaty must be
approved by the treaty's signatories.
2 . Barents Sea Continental Shelf
Norway and the Soviet Union have been negotiating
about the line of demarcation between their respective
continental shelves in the Barents Sea since 1970. Eoth
countries have agreed that the ultimate solution must be
based on th-e Geneva Continental Shelf Convention of 1958 to
which both countries are signatories. The Soviets ratified
the agreement on 20 October 1960 but the Norwegians
refrained from ratifying the agreement until
9 September 1971. 18 ^ This convention states:
"1. Where the continental shelf is adiacent to the
territories of two or more states whose coasts are
opposite each other, the boundary of the continental
shelf apertaining to such states shall be determined
by an agreement between them. In the absence of
agreement and unless another boundary line is
justified by special circumstances, the boundary is
the median line every point of which is equidistant
from the nearest points of the base lines from which




"2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to
the territories of two adjacent states, the boundary
of the continental shelf shall be determined by
agreement between them. In the absence of such
agreement and unless another boundary line is
justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall
be determined by application of the principle of
equidistance from the nearest points of the base line
from which the territorial sea of each state is
measured. "184
These principles were replaced in the subsequent
Law of the Sea Treaty in Article 83 which states:
"1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between
adjacent or opposite states shall be effected by
agreement in accordance with equitable principles,
employing, where appropriate the median or
equidistance line, and taking account of all the
relevant circumstances."
The new text leaves the demarcation of the continental
shelf still subject to agreements between states and this
demarcation is to be performed while taking due account of
all relevant special circumstances.
In interpreting the clauses of the 1958 convention
the International Court of Justice in 1969 ruled that:
"...neither the effect of the Geneva convention nor of
the state practice since its signing justified the
inference that delimitation according to the principle
of equidistance rises to the level of a mandatory rule
of customary law."l°->
The abandoning of all mention of the equidistant principle
from the new treaty supports this position.
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The International Court found in 1969 that neither
the equidistance method nor any ether method of delimita-
tion was obligatory. The court stressed that such
delimitation should have as a basis the following legal
principles:
"...that delimitation must be the object of the
agreement between the states concerned and that such
agreements must be arrived at in accordance with
equitable principles . "186
Thus Norway and the Soviet Union must agree on the final
delimitation between them and this need for agreement has
led to each side taking a different interpretation of the
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.
The Norwegians have held that the median line
principle should be used for the delimitation of the
Barents Sea's continental shelf. The technical definition
of a median line is a line every point of which is
equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial seas of the two
coastal states is measured. Thus the Norwegian median line
would proceed north from the boundary of each country's
territorial waters to a point halfway between Svalbard and
Soviet Novaya Femlia (see Figure 11)
.
The Soviet Union has consistently maintained that
the continental shelf in the Barents Sea must be divided on
the basis of the sector principle. By this method a line
is drawn directly from the point where the international
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(mainland) border meets the sea to the North Pole. 189
This position is partly influenced by a decree promulgated
in 1926 which first formulated the Soviet sector claim, when
it stated:
"All lands and islands both discovered and which may
be discovered in the future, which do not comprise at
the time of publication the territory of any foreign
state recognized by the Government of the USSR,
located in the Northern Arctic Oceans, north of the
shores of the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics up
to the North Pole... are proclaimed to be the territory
of the USSR." 188
This decree makes no claim to the area beneath the sea but
has been used to further assert the Soviet position
regarding its "sector claim".
"In those areas where Soviet territorial waters
adjoin those of a neighboring state, the maritime lateral
state boundary is established by agreements concluded with
those countries." The Norwegians and the Soviets concluded
such an agreement on 15 February 1957. At this time Norway
had territorial waters of four miles while the Soviet Union
had territorial waters of 12 miles. The agreement allowed
for a future extension of Norway's territorial waters to 12
miles but if Figure 12 is studied closely AC is the actual
median line while AB is the agreed upon border thus giving
the Soviets area ABC for future use. 190
The Soviets hold that the sector principle applies
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over application of the Norwegian median line or the Soviet
sector principle concerns an area of 155,000 sq km anu is
larger than the entire Norwegian continental shelf i^ the
North Sea. 192 The Soviets hold that the Geneva
Convention allowed for another boundary line other than the
median line when it was "...justified by special circum-
stances." The Soviet position is that "the size of the
population on the Kola Peninsula and its economic signifi-
cance compared with that of Northern Norway, plus
the military-strategic importance of the Kola base
structure"193 constitute "special circumstances",
justifying a dividing line much further wes than the median
line. The International Court of Justice in 1969 ruled
that special circumstances included the configuration of
the coasts, the physical and geological structure and
natural resources of the continental shelf and a reaonable
degree of proportionality .194 a further consideration
has been accepted - i.e., investment (e.g., oil rigs) which
has been made in the disputed area. This might well be the
motive for the commencement of Soviet oil drilling 1.5
miles west of the disputed median line in the Barents
Sea.l^ 5 The Norwegian Royal decree issued on
1 May 1963 establishing Norwegian control over Norway's
offshore subsea resources makes no allowance for special
circumstances and is made "...irrespective of any other
146

territorial limits at sea, but not beyond the median line
in relation to other states."^
The Soviet claims of "special circumstances" based
on its sector principle does not appear to meet the require-
ments previously laid down by the International Court of
Justice in its previous decisions and is of dubious inter-
national standing, with only Canada and the Soviet Union
advocating its applicability to the Arctic. 1*7
3 . Grey Zones of the Barents Sea
The North Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the Barents
Sea represent some of the world's richest fishing areas and
for many years more than 20 per cent of the world's catch
originated in this region. 98 The exploitation was
not in proportion to the size of the stocks and over-
exploitation occurred. This became apparent to the Soviets
and Norwegians in the early 1970s, particularly in regard
to Arctic Cod. It became evident that "arrangements for
fisheries management could not await the resolution of the
related Barents Sea continental shelf issue. "I* 9
In late 1976 Norway declared a 200 mile Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) and the Soviet Union declared a 200
mile Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) . Norway and the
Soviet Union had previously agreed on mutual access, total
chatches and on quotas within their waters out to 20 miles
but the problem of inspection and enforcement rights with
regard to third parties (e.g., EEC vessels) within the
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disputed area was now raised. Bilateral negotiations were
entered into concerning the overlapping Soviet and
Norwegian fisheries jurisdiction claims (see Figure 13)
.
In June 1977 a temporary Soviet-Norwegian fisheries
management agreement was reached.
This agreement has come to be called the "Grey
Zone" agreement and became effective in January 1978. In
order to obtain agreement, the Norwegian negotiators agreed
to joint enforcement within the disputed or "Grey Area."
Each state has jurisdiction over its own vessels and those
of third countries licensed by it. The Grey Zone estab-
lished by the agreement not only covered the disputed area
but also encompassed an area of 23,000 sq km (8,000 sq
miles) west of the sector line and an area of 3,000 sq km
#
(1,200 sq miles) east of the median line. 200 Over 30
per cent of the Grey Zone lies West of the sector line (an
area of formerly unambiguous Norwegian control and
sovereignty)
.
The Grey Zone represents a temporary agreement that
has been renewed each year as it has expired with the
latest extension being signed on 24 June 19 83 for another
year. These agreements have been the subject of more
political controversy (over the definition of the area or
zone) than the actual content of the agreement. 201
Norway has actively sought to separate the immediate need
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and maintains that the agreement would not prejudice
either side's position regarding jurisdiction over the
continental shelf. The Norwegians believe that it is more
important for the Barents Sea Cod and Capelin total catch
and quotas to be determined, than it is to determine
whether the quotas are caught within Norwegian or Soviet
jurisdiction. 202
E. NEGOTIATIONS
Discussions over these and other issues have been on
going since 1970, when informal talks were opened. Formal
talks commenced in 1974 and the only agreement that Norway
and the Soviet Union have reached was the agreement
creating the Grey Zone, which is an agreement to disagree
(as neither side holds the agreement to effect their
competing claims over the continental shelf) . Norway has
sought to prevent negotiations on one issue from having an
effect on negotiations on another issue. Norway's position
is further complicated by on going negotiations with other
countries. This is evident in Norwegian fears that conces-
sions over Jan Mayen might encourage Soviet expectations of
similar gains in the Barents Sea. 203 In addition, a
conflict over resources between allies could lead to a
weakening of alliance ties between members of NATO. 204
With the commencement of exploratory drilling in the
Barents Sea by the Soviet Union and as further development
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in this area proceeds, the unresolved issues between
Norway and the Soviet Union could serve as a source of
increasing conflict. "As the exploitation of resources
preoccupies nations more it may influence public attitudes
to security." 205 Norwegian appreciation of Soviet
insecurities and efforts to reach agreements on urgent
resources management problems with Moscow might entail a
possible encouragement of Soviet pressures for a more
comprehensive condominium- type economic arrangement for the
Barents Sea and a precedent could be set in Norwegian-
Soviet relations in that the Norwegian authorities might be
tempted to seek some kind of compromise with the Soviet
Union within an emerging bilateral framework which could
complicate Norway's position and in effect limit her role
within the multilateral security framework of NATO.
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VI. NORDIC BALANCE AMD DEFENSE COMMITMENT
A. NORDIC BALANCE
The idea of a Nordic Balance 206 has been often
cited as contributing to stability in Northern Europe.
In truth the Nordic balance represents an ex post facto
rationalization of past political decisions rather than the
conscious pursuit of a predetermined objective. It is no
more than the recognition of the stability of the geopolit-
ical situation of the Nordic countries (Norway, Denmark,
Sweden and Finland) . This stability is reflected in the
relations among themselves and the two superpowers. 207
Each country's security policy is viewed in the light
of its neighbors. This balance has been created in a
situation where the goal of the two superpowers in the area
has been one of denial to the opponent rather than posses-
sion. The present alignment of the Nordic countries gives
both the superpowers a reasonable defense assurance.
The concept of a Nordic balance has three main
qualities: (1) it exists in a bi-polar world; (2) the
Nordic system is a subset of the global system; and (3) the
system represents an interplay between global and local
interests and forces. Thus each country's security policy
160

is viewed in the light of its interaction and effects on
its neighbors. Developments in one country can have
serious consequences within the others.
The political orientation of the four countries varies
from Norway and Denmark's alliance in NATO with the Western
powers to Sweden's armed neutrality and thence to Finland's
neutrality coupled with her special relationship with the
Soviet Union. In partial regard to the nearness of and the
vital and strategic interest that the Soviets have in the
area, both Denmark and Norway have placed unilateral
restrictions regarding bases^08 ana nuclear weapons on
their participation in NATO so as to demonstrate the purely
defensive nature of their actions. As part of Norway's
policy of balancing deterrence and reassurance Norway has
reserved the right to interpret and change its unilateral
bans as it sees fit. The bans were made on the condition
that Norway not be attacked or threatened by attack.
Sweden assumed an unconditional position of neutrality.
Its armed forces were sufficient strength to deter an
aggressor by the fact that conquest of Sweden would be
sufficiently difficult that costs would outweigh any
possible gains. Norwegian Defense Minister Jens Christian
Hauge asserted that Sweden's position of neutrality was of
value to Norv/ay as it muted Soviet misapprehensions about
the North Atlantic Treaty. 209 Even militarily Sweden's
stance was of value because Sweden was well armed and thus
161

any possible aggressor attempting to cross Swedish
territory to strike at Norway might expect stiff Swedish
resistance to the use of its territory,
Finland's official status is one of neutrality but
Finland does have certain limitations placed on it by
the World War II peace treaty signed in 19 47 with the
Allied and Associated Powers (Russia, United Kingdom,
Australia, Canada, Czechlosovakia, India, New Zealand and
the Union of South Africa) . The treaty limits the Finnish
armed forces to 42,500 men and prohibits nuclear weapons,
guided missiles, submarines, motor torpedo boats and
bombers. It has been interpreted to permit defensive
surface-to-air missiles and air-to-air missiles. 210 On
28 April 1948 Finland concluded a Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet
Union which in Article IV pledged Finland "...not to con-
clude any alliance or join any coalition directed against
the Soviet Union. "211 This enhanced the position of
Finnish neutrality, as it made it more credible in Soviet
eyes. In addition the treaty established that Finland
promised to defend her territory against "Germany or any
other state allied with her," if aggression were aimed
against Finland or the Soviet Union. A separate clause
provided for mutual consultation "if it is established that
the threat of an armed attack is present" 212 and to
162

accept Soviet aid. Finland in the treaty did not have to
accept responsibility for actions outside her own
territory .213
The interaction of these security policies is what has
come to be the fulcrum around which the mutual restraint of
the superpowers has come to function. The most explicit
use of the Nordic balance doctrine took place during the
Finnish-Soviet "note crisis" of October/November 1961.
This crisis was described in Chapter V and revealed the
workings of the "balance."
In the case of Sweden, when discussions of a change in
Swedish neutrality as a possible response to Soviet
pressure on Finland was brought up, the Prime Minister
declared that Swedish neutrality could not be shifted back
and forth according to the vicissitudes of international
affairs and that the policy could not be given varying
interpretations in order to serve foreign interests. Such
interpretations would undermine the credibility of Swedish
neutrality.
^
4 Swedish foreign policy had two aims.
One was to maintain her neutrality and the second was not
to take measures that would harm Finland's interests.
The Norwegian statements regarding possible changes in
defense policies in response to Soviet pressure on Finland
were a double-edged sword. A Norwegian willingness to
adjust her security policies could also be interpreted as a
willingness on Norway's part to limit her freedom of
163

action. If Norway were to condition her non-use of her
policy option on the condition of good Soviet behavior
toward Finland, then the Soviets could reverse the situa-
tion by arguing that exercise of the Norwegian options for
other purposes or in different circumstances would give the
Soviets a justification for moves against Finland, thus
placing the blame on Norway. This would increase inhibi-
tions against Norwegian actions under other situations.
If Norway chose to exercise her option of accepting
foreign troops or nuclear weapons, it could not be used a
second time. Its main value is in its non-exercise and
thus maintaining a low level of tension in Northern Europe.
In addition, over the years, these policies have become
nearly sacrosanct and short of an actual invation it is
almost impossible to envision a change in this aspect of
reassurance. "The theory of a Nordic balance thus leaves
the impression of a fairly stable system of regional
security based on four countries pursuing a policy of
calculated weakness" 215 as regards the Soviet Union.
The balance is likely to be more effective as a description
of normal times than it would be in efforts to restore the
"balance" in a time of crisis.
B. NORWAY'S COMMITMENT TO DEFENSE AND NATO
In the years from 1973 to 19 82 there has been a steady
increase in the belief that Norway should maintain a
164

military establishment (see Table III). Along with this
increase in support of the military defense establish-
ment the proportion of NATO supporters increased from




Norwegian support for NATO does not necessarily trans-
late into unqualified support for all NATO policies.
Norway has officially supported NATO's 1979 two-track
decision concerning the deployment of the Pershing II
missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles to Europe
beginning in December 19 83. This support for the NATO
deployment has not been total throughout the population and
has been the subject of a major controversy. The Labour
Party's national executive agreed on a strategy aimed at
avoiding the deployment of the missiles 2 -1-' and at the
national Congress in Oslo on 22-24 April a unanimous
resolution was adopted. This resolution had as its goal
the reduction of missiles in Eastern Europe and no
deployment in the West. The existing proposals set forth
by the United States and the Soviet Union were classified
as insufficient. According to the resolution no deployment
of missiles was to take place while the talks are in
progress. In an attempt to express their disapproval the
Labor Party attempted to cut off Norway's contribution to
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amount of about 7 million dollars). Their efforts failed
by one vote in November 19 83.
The question of "burden sharing" should be reexamined
here as Norway was willing to share the "burden" of the
decision to pay for and deploy the missiles, but Norway was
unwilling to have the missiles deployed onto Norwegian
territory. Norway was willing to help buy the umbrella of
NATO atomic protection and shelter beneath it but unwilling
to help hold it. This contradiction was based on Norway's
long standing ban on nuclear weapons and Norway's fears
concerning its involvement in vertical or horizontal
escalation.
Vertical escalation may be said to consist of at least
four phases. The first phase involves using diplomacy,
psychological tactics, economic means, military help and
demonstrations to counter aggression. The second phase is
conventional defense and the third phase involves the use
of tactical nuclear weapons. The last phase is all out
atomic war. The fear of the Norwegians here is that they
do not have control of the "escalation ladder" and thus
efforts may escalate without sufficient effort being
employed to resolve a crisis at the first "rung" of the
ladder.
Horizontal escalation is a fear that conflict in one
geographical area will spread to others. This is most
easily shown by the use of the Carter doctrine. It was
16 8

feared that encroachments in the Middle East (after
Afghanistan) would be net by efforts in other areas. This
was expressed in 19 80 by the then-Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown that the Soviet Union might expect repercus-
sions "as far north as Norway" in response to further
incursions into the Middle East. Such statements only
increased Norwegian fears. ^°
Efforts to establish a nuclear free zone in Northern
Europe have been around since it was first proposed in
letters to the Nordic chiefs of government by Soviet
Premier Bulganin in January 1958. Norway has never
accepted the proposals but at the same time Norway has
never totally rejected the proposal. In evaluating the
proposal Norway suggested certain themes and conditions:
(1) Norway was interested in maintaining the
equilibrium in Northern Europe and hence unwilling
to enter into obligations which would weaken the
links to the rest of Europe.
(2) A Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the north
should be part of more comprehensive negotiations
about arms control and disarmament.
(3) A NWFZ should be part of a broader arrangement in
Europe in order to prevent decoupling and
isolation.
(4) Some limits must be imposed on Soviet nuclear
weapons in close proximity to the Nordic area.
169

Norway has remained concerned about not entering into
arrangements which would weaken links to NATO and alliance
strategy for the common defense. 213
The Nordic countries at the present moment do in fact
constitute a nuclear free zone. All four are signatories
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in addition Finland is
forbidden nuclear weapons by its peace treaty with the
Allies at the end of World War II. Both Norway and Denmark
have established unilateral bans on nuclear weapons within
their territory. Thus to change to a formal ratification
and binding agreement the proposal would have to offer more
than a mere ratification of the status quo.
The only country with nuclear weapons in the north is
the Soviet Union. 'While various proposals have been made,
the Soviets have made clear that no part of the Soviet
Union could be made part of a nuclear free zone. The
Soviets have offered to take "unspecified measures," but
given the range of today's weapons and technological
change, it "does not appear likely that any such zone could
constitute any real guarantee for the security of the
Nordic countries. "220
It is interesting to note that on 27 October 1981 the
Soviet diesel-powered WHISKEY Class submarine, Number 137,
ran aground in Sweden territorial waters and that measure-
ments of radiation indicated the presence of nuclear
torpedos aboard the unit. The significance of this event
170

to the drive for a nuclear free zone was that it drove
heme the relevance of concern over Soviet systems. It came
as no surprise that the Soviets had nuclear torpedos but
that "such weapons would be deployed on so obsolete a
vessel (built in the 1950's), in the Baltic and on a
submarine that was sent deep into Swedish territorial
waters on a hazardous escapade." 221 The net result of
this incident was to further convince Norway, Denmark and
Sweden that any nuclear free zone in the north would have
to include the Soviet Union and "must be conditional on
reductions in the amount of nuclear weapons in areas
adjacent to and reductions in the number of nuclear weapons
targeted on the Nordic area." 222
Within Norway the issue has a high degree of emotional
appeal and is championed by the Labor Party and the group
"No-to-Nuclear-Weapons. " This group collected 540,268
signatures to a petition that stated:
"We ask the Storting to decide that the use of nuclear
weapons on or from Norwegian territory will not be
permitted, and we urge the Government to work actively
to establish by treaty a nuclear weapon- free zone
which comprises Norway, Denmark and Finland. 222
The signatures represented nearly one-eighth of the
Norwegian population of four million.
C. DEFENSE SUPPORT
The Norwegian Defense effort has been consistent and
defense efforts have consistently constituted around three
171

per cent of the Gross National Product (GNP) (see Table V)
.
The defense forces of the country account for three
per cent of Norwegian employment. Wages account for more
than 40 per cent of total expenditures for defense while
the investments in materiel have been around 20 per cent
(see Table VI)
.
Investments have concentrated on the air force for the
purchase of 72 F-16 aircraft. The Air Force has accounted
for 77 per cent of materiel investment, the Navy eight
per cent and the Army 14 per cent. The F-16 purchase
program is drawing to a close but the Navy will be acquir-
ing a new generation of submarines. Defense studies,
though, have indicated that investment priority should
favor the Army. The Defense Commission of 1974 recommended
a new structure for the Army's brigades. The new structure
was termed Brigade 90 and involved higher mobility,
firepower and air defense. In addition, three brigades
would be converted to Brigade 90 PF with an armored
battalion replacing one of the three infantry battalions
within a brigade. 223
With the world wide recession, Norway's economy
has been extremely hard hit and Norway's ability to
continue its defense effort has been severely hampered.
As Defense Minister Ander C. Sjaastad noted in a speech
on 29 April 19 83, Norway can not live up to the budget
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postulated that the Norwegian expenditure as a percentage
of GNP would rise to four per cent and it was stated by the
Chief of Defnese in testimony before the Defense Commission
this was 0.5 per cent too low.
The disparity between funds and goals has led to the
following economic measures: ^24
(1) The Brigade 90 and 90 PF program has been slowed.
It will not commence until the 19 84-85 period and
then be limited to the Northern brigade first.
(2) The material condition of the Navy will remain to a
large extent unchanged in the period 19 84-88. This
represents a lengthening of the effective operating
life of both ships and coastal defense beyond that
normally planned on.
(3) For the Air Force, a search is in progress for a
means of reducing operating expenses.
(4) A consolidation of training schools and changes in
the administration of the officer training
program.
The impact of budqet shortfalls will be felt in the
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND PROBLEMS
In examining Norway's transition from neutrality
to alliance. Norway's forces in relation to the Soviet
forces arrayed against them, the avowed Norwegian security
policy of reassurance and deterrence, the Nordic balance
and Norway's defense commitment, and the pattern of Soviet-
Norwegian relations since World War II, one is reminded of
Johan Hoist's observation that Norv/ay's NATO membership
is more "a marriage of convenience rather than one based
on passion." In this regard the guarantee inherent in
alliance membership is a political guarantee. It serves as
a long-term insurance policy against harassment, intimida-
tion, and attack. 225
In examining Norwegian security policy one comes to
fear that both NATO and Norway are suffering from wearing
"blinders" and maintaining the appearance of calm on the
Northern Flank at the cost of only seeing those items they
wish to see.
One of the basic tenets has been that, given sufficient
warning time, NATO and Norway can respond in a sufficient
manner to deter any Soviet aggression. This raises the
question of what is sufficient warning time. In 1970-1972
General Sir Walter Walker as head of NATO's Northern
Command spoke out publicly about the defensibility of both
178

Norway and Denmark. A tremendous furor was raised and
since this warnings of twelve years ago problems such as
air station defenses remain unresolved. 22^ Norway has
decided to purchase the new improved Hawk missile batteries
but these systems are still not yet in place.
Norwegian forces are incapable of defeating those
forces most likely to be employed against them that are
presently deployed on the Kola Peninsula. Norway is thus
dependent upon reinforcements. The ability of NATO to
reinforce in time of crisis is dependent upon a number of
factors. The first factor is that reinforcements do not
occur in response to a specific Soviet action. These
reinforcements must be requested by Norwegian authorities.
This request may not be readily forthcoming, as the
temptation might be to wait and see what happens, as in
1968, rather than to risk a possible escalation of tension.
A request to NATO for reinforcements would require a
unanimity of opinion to give a NATO response. This may not
be readily forthcoming for a variety of reasons. Fear of
escalation, a possible disagreement over the meaning of
Soviet actions or the best way to counter them, or a
conflict between members over other issues such as the
British-Iceland Cod wars might all inhibit agreement. This




What could not be avoided is that reinforcements would
of necessity come by sea or air. This effort would require
the utilization of a large number of planes or ships.
These may not be readily available on short notice. Even
with prior planning a scarcity of resources may inhibit
operations, as seen by the fact in 1976 during exercise
Mainspring, chartered Norwegian commercially-owned ferries
had to be used to move a number of troops from Britain to
Norway. "7
Even if the resources were available, would the facil-
ities be available to receive them? Norway's ability to
provide defense for its airfields is highly suspect and at
most airfields consist of obsolete L-60 artillery without
an all weather capability.
^
28 This raises the question
as to whether these fields would be available or capable of
receiving reinforcements in time of crisis. As for rein-
forcement by sea the growing Soviet naval capabilities in
the North place the NATO ability to reinforce in question.
Problems v/ith acquiring the ships to move the men, equip-
ment and supplies exist. The Soviets have the ability to
interdict supplies by conducting strikes against the port
terminals and with Norway's poor land communication system
the onward movement of supplies is questionable.
Another area of concern is the lack of recognition on
both the part of NATO and Norway to the risk of Soviet use
of chemical weapons. This is seen in the lack of mention
180

of this threat in the 19 82 NATO report Facts and Figures,
NATO and Warsaw Pact - A Force Comparison . The Soviets
have a large arsenal of chemical weapons and are regularly
trained in NBC warfare and protection. 2 ^9
The downturn in Norway's economy has severely affected
the defense forces and the cutbacks and failures to
purchase needed equipment affect the force composition and
capabilities of tomorrow. The most severe deficiency in
this regard is that Norway does not have the money to buy
replacements for the F-16 aircraft which are lost in
accidents. Air Force Inspector Major General Magne
Sorenesen has estimated that in 1992 the total of F-16
aircraft will be reduced from 72 to 57 through accidents
unless replacements are procured.
The impact of budget cutting has been felt in civil
defense where up until 19 82 plans called for evacuating
one million people from 36 cities. Plans for evacuat-
ing the northern most province of Finnmark have been
entirely laid aside as it would depend upon the military
situation. 230
In the final analysis Norway's ability to survive is
not really in question. The true issue is Norway's ability
to ensure that her policy of reassurance (which has
tailored Norway's force posture since her joining NATO)
does not become a policy of "Finnlandization"^ JJ- by
another name- The reassurance displayed by Norway is
181

the first index of Finlandization ("consideration of
and - adjustment to Soviet interests") developed by
R.V. Vincent. ^
-
The Norwegian government's response
in crises with the Soviets may be classified as prudent
restraint or as cautious deference.
With the local predominance of Soviet forces the fear
exists that the Soviet Union might exploit her local super-
iority by transferring the onus of starting a conflict to
the West. This would be a reversal of the roles in the
Cuba crisis of 1962. The crisis could conceivably begin by
Norway requesting assistance; and despite Norway's frequent
assertion that Norway's reservations on foreign troops were
a unilateral restriction, the Soviets might assert that it
had been a bilateral guarantee and could utilize it as a
pretext for entry in Norwegian politics.
In 1949 the Norwegian King issued a statement that, if
Norway were invaded, the Norwegian Armed Forces were to
resist to the maximum extent possible and disregard orders
to the contrary. With the growth of concern over nuclear
weapons and the desire to reach agreement on contentious,
issues with the Soviets, politicians might be tempted to
accept a less than totally satisfactory agreement, as shown
by the Grey Zone Agreement. Perhaps the true question is
not whether the Norwegian Armed Forces would resist or how
well, but rather whether they would be given the choice.
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What issue would the politicians consider going to war for,
short of an actual invasion',9233
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